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The 5
th framework programme research project ACCESSLAB researches the capability of candidate
countries￿ regions to deal with asymmetric shocks. Its goal is to provide analysts and policy makers
with research results relevant to the process of enlargement. The project takes a broad and
comparative view of labour market adjustments to address these issues. It examines the topic from
both a macroeconomic and microeconomic viewpoint. It considers different adjustment
mechanisms in depth and compares results with the European Union. It draws on a) the
experiences in transition countries in the last decade, b) the experience of German integration and
c) the experiences of border regions to gain insights on the likely regional labour market effects of
accession of the candidate countries.
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1 1
Understanding the workings of labour markets in candidate countries and European Union
member states is important for both normative as well as positive reasons. From a normative
perspective it is important to analyse how countries from such a starkly different background as that
of the current candidate countries have coped with the dramatic changes in labour demand and
how their adjustment differs from long established market economies. In the context of transition,
economic theories can be tested in a highly volatile environment and institutional settings that differ
widely from those in mature market economies. From a positive point of view the capability of
(regional) labour markets in the candidate countries to cope with changes in labour demand and
supply will be of particular relevance in the process of European integration.
This research project is interested in assessing the capability of candidate countries￿ regional
labour markets to adjust to ￿shocks￿ to labour demand and supply. In this context the current
flexibility of labour markets is an important starting point of our analysis. This literature survey
presents an overview of the labour market developments in the Central and Eastern European
candidate countries and results concerning different aspects of ￿labour market flexibility￿.
We are particularly interested in the effects of European integration on the workings of regional
labour markets. Answering this question is, however, plagued by a number of methodological
problems. These stem from a) the uniqueness of integrating the current candidate countries into the
European Union, which makes it difficult to draw valid comparisons from history and b) the
possibility that integration may itself impact on the capability of candidate countries to adapt to
￿shocks￿.
We propose three ￿historical analogies￿ to deal with these methodological problems:
• First, we use the experience of regional labour market development in current candidate
countries in comparisons with current member states of the EU. This enables us to account for
the institutional differences between candidate countries and current member states. We are
thus able to assess how regional labour markets in candidate countries react to ￿shocks￿, given
the current institutional set-up in these countries, and the ways in which this reaction differs
from that in current member states.
• Second, we use the experience of German unification as the only historical example of
complete integration of a formerly planned economy into a European market economy. While
this example may not represent a fully valid historical analogy to the European integration
process due to differences in the speed and scope between German unification and European
1 The authors would like to thank Fritz Breuss and Christopher Gerry for helpful comments. Maria Thalhammer, Andrea
Hartmann and Andrea Grabmayer provided helpful research assistance for this survey.￿3￿
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integration, it will allow us to assess some of the issues arising from the potential endogeneity
of the transmission mechanism to integration in an extreme setting, where the institutions of one
country were fully integrated by another.
• Third, we will use the experience of recent European integration processes along border
regions. This provides a further opportunity to gauge the effects of endogeneity of institutions by
the adjustment capabilities of regional labour markets. In contrast to the case of German
unification, this comparison will encompass integration processes which are more comparable
in scope and speed to what may be expected from future European integration. However, it
fails to take full account of the differences in economic development and institutions between
current member states and candidate countries.
This literature survey marks the ￿start up￿ of the project. It aims at forming both a common view
and definition of the problems addressed, as well as bringing together previous research on the
topics of regional and labour market adjustment in the candidate countries in order to identify a
￿common basis￿ concerning the topics covered in the project.
In this survey our main interest is with summarising the empirical findings. In the next chapter we
review institutional and labour market developments in the candidate countries since the political
reforms which marked the start of transition. In chapter 2 we present some literature on the
potential changes of institutions, trade, migration and FDI which may be triggered by enlargement.
In chapter 3 we summarise empirical findings concerning labour market dynamics and adjustment,
and chapter 4 then looks at regional development. Chapter five summarises the research on the
effects of the two other examples of European Integration which we have chosen, and chapter six
concludes the survey by discussing how the results can be interpreted with regard to European
integration and posing some questions for further research.￿4￿
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In the ten years since the beginning of market-oriented reforms in the Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs), the debate of economists on the workings of labour markets in this
region has passed through a number of distinct phases, marked by the predominant policy
challenges faced in the countries under consideration. In the early analyses the main dispute was
on the optimal speed of transition. Virtually all analysts expected an initial drop in employment
levels and an associated surge in unemployment arising from the shedding of labour in
unproductive firms at the outset of transition. There was, however, some debate about how long it
would take for these initial employment losses to be compensated by the creation of new and
viable activities. One group of authors (e.g. Sachs, 1992; Sachs and Lipton, 1990) suggested that
once market forces were unleashed, new activities would rapidly develop. Another group (e.g.
Kornai, 1989; Brada and King, 1992) tended to stress the institutional differences between
planned and market economies and argued that without building the institutional framework of
market economies ￿ which would require some time ￿ no recovery would be possible.
Models of the optimal speed of transition (OST) literature, see Aghion and Blanchard, 1993;
Chadha, Coricelli and Krajnak, 1993; Boeri, 2000) took an intermediate position in this debate.
They focused on the problems associated with moving from a primarily state-owned to a privately
owned economy. For instance, according to Aghion and Blanchard (1993), governments can
influence the downsizing of the state sector through reductions of subsidies to state-owned
enterprises and the creation of unemployment benefits. The central trade-off is that, if subsidies are
reduced too slowly, this will cause low unemployment rates and thus upward wage pressure, which
slows the growth of the new private sector. Reducing subsidies too quickly, however, would erode
the tax base used to finance unemployment benefits and thus necessitate higher wage taxes. This
too would increase total wage costs and thus hamper the development of the new private sector.
Recently, the emphasis in the analysis of the most advanced candidate countries has shifted from
problems associated with transition to issues of accession to the European Union. In this literature
(see: Knogler, 2001; Gacs, 1999; Eurostat, 2001, 2001a; and Belke and Hebler, 2002) the
major focus is on determining to what degree candidate countries have converged towards EU
standards in terms of institutions and labour market indicators such as employment, unemployment
and participation rates.￿5￿
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This literature suggests that the ￿transformation crisis￿ (Kornai, 1994) has been prolonged. For
instance Boeri, Burda and K￿ll￿ (1998), in a recent survey of the labour market developments in
the large candidate countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia),
find that from 1990 to 1996 employment rates of males decreased in excess of 10% of the
working age population and even more dramatically for females in all countries but the Czech
Republic. Furthermore, by 1998 only three (Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) of 13 transition
economies analysed by Mickiewicz and Bell (2000) had reached their 1989 GDP levels;
employment levels in 1996 were between 5.6% (Romania) and 22.9% (Hungary) below pre-
transition levels. Boeri (2001) finds that among the three large groups of countries analysed
(Vysegrad, Balkan and FSU), only the first has attained GDP levels exceeding those at the start of
transition by 1998, while employment levels remained well below 1989 levels throughout. A
number of stylised facts stick out when analysing this decline:
1. Probably the most important is the heterogeneity among transition economies. In general only
the Central and Eastern European candidate countries have re-emerged on the path of
employment and GDP growth, while countries of the former Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) are still in decline or just about returning to growth. But even within Central and
Eastern European candidate countries, disparities seem to be large, persistent and increasing.
Several studies test for convergence in unemployment rates, both amongst the transition
economies and in relation to the EU. Boone and Maurel (1998) found some evidence for
convergence of unemployment rates between seven candidate countries and the EU. Similarly,
Andreff (1999) tests for convergence in several nominal and real indicators, evaluating beta (b)
and sigma convergence (s) plus coefficients of variation (s/m). He observes that ￿the
unemployment rate is, ironically, the real variable with the clearest convergence between the
TE-10 (i.e. the candidate countries) and the EU.￿ He also finds that the ￿divergence of
unemployment rates among both the TE-10 and TE-5 (￿first wave￿) has tended to decrease￿.
Similarly, Mickiewicz and Bell (2000) report convergence in unemployment rates amongst the
whole group of transition economies, both as measured by standard deviation and coefficient
of variation. They argue that the process of convergence in unemployment amongst the TE has
been driven by increase in unemployment rates in late 1990s in countries, which postponed
restructuring and therefore avoided early emergence of open unemployment, a strategy, which
proved to be unsustainable in the longer term.
2
2 Slow progress in restructuring relates to the CIS countries in particular. Amongst the EU candidate countries, Czech
Republic has been an outlier, with much lower unemployment rates throughout the 1990s. Increase in unemployment in
Czech Republic in late 1990s also contributed to convergence in unemployment rates.￿6￿
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The assessment of convergence in labour market indicators links to literature on convergence
in income levels and on determinants of growth of income during transition. The link between
the two is obvious, if we notice that ￿labour is a fundamental determinant of growth, because
of the sheer size of the labour force as well as the quality of the labour input (human capital)￿
(Campos and Coricelli, 2002, p. 14). However, the same authors observe that the contribution
of human capital and labour to growth is still not well explored in relation to transition
economies (Ibid., p. 46-47).
A Recent study by Wagner and Hlouskova (2002) contrasts the assessment of s-convergence
in income levels within the EU, with that of the candidate countries and the EU. While, the
process of convergence within the EU is visible, the dispersion within the candidates countries
group increased significantly between 1990 and 1994 and stagnated thereafter. Substantial
research has gone into determining what were the causes of this divergence and corresponding
differences in growth rates. Important contributions include Fischer et al. (1996, 1996a,
1997), Sachs (1996), DeMelo et al. (1997), Selowsky and Martin (1997), Christoffersen and
Dole (1998), Havrylyshyn et al. (1998), Aslund Boone and Johnson, 1996, Berg et al. (1999),
Fischer und Sahay (2000), Campos and Coricelli (2002). This literature suggests that at the
national level both variables measuring institutional reforms (such as EBRD transition indices)
and macroeconomic stabilisation indicators are important correlates of the ￿success of
transition￿. Initial conditions play some role, but their effect is fading with time.
2. Employment losses were unevenly distributed across different groups in the population. Boeri,
Burda and K￿ll￿ (1998), in looking at different age and gender cells in the employment
distribution, find that employment rates declined most markedly for the young and the older
population.
These stylised facts do not suggest that labour markets in candidate countries have been highly
dynamic. But employment creation has been low in many countries of the European Union (and
correspondingly, long term unemployment remained high). Nickell et al. (2001) are able to explain
most of the long term deterioration in labour market performance by institutional factors, i.e.
changes in benefit systems, labour taxation, union variables and employment law in particular (for
surveys of earlier literature, see: Bean, 1994 and Siebert, 1997). Also the literature on labour
market adjustments in the EU (Fatas, 2000, Decressin and Fatas 1995) shows that shocks to
employment are highly persistent in EU countries. This suggests that perhaps the differences
between candidate countries and EU member states may be overrated in particular in the light of
the substantial heterogeneity among member states in the European Union.
Recently, a number of studies have argued that problems in the accession countries may be less
pronounced than initially expected. Gros (2002) suggests that while candidate countries will
remain substantially poorer than the average member state for some years to come, their higher
GDP growth may make integration less problematic than suggested by income differentials alone.￿7￿
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Huber (2002) analyses regional labour market adjustment in the Vysegrad countries (Poland,
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) plus Slovenia. He finds that in general, regional
unemployment rates and wages are less persistent than in the EU and that wages react more
strongly to regional unemployment rates in the candidate countries than in member states.This
reflects positively on the capacity of regions to absorb region specific-shocks. Boeri, Burda, K￿ll￿
(1998) argue that the Central and Eastern European candidate countries seem to have overtaken
development in some middle income countries such as Portugal, which could claim higher
employment rates, in 1989. The employment rate in the Czech Republic in 1998 exceeded that of
the Netherlands and Austria ￿ two high employment countries ￿, while that of Poland was
comparable to Ireland￿s. Only Hungary￿s employment rate was below the level of Greece.
Mickiewicz and Bell (2000) finds that the share of female employment was higher in the Central
and Eastern European candidate countries than in most EU member states. Finally, Knogler (2001)
applies the same standards as developed by the DG Employment to monitor the development of
labour markets in the member states and candidate countries. He finds that for most indicators, the
majority of candidate countries does not differ strongly from the EU average and in general
perform better concerning indicators of gender differences.
Table 1: Indicators of employment in candidate countries, 2000
Employment rate Employment rate men Employment rate
women
Employment gender
gap*
Employment rate
55￿64
Bulgaria 49.2 53.4 45.3 0.85 18.9
Czech Republic 64.9 73.1 56.8 0.78 36.1
Estonia 60.6 64.3 57.1 0.89 43.0
Hungary 55.9 62.7 49.4 0.79 21.9
Lithuania 60.1 61.8 58.5 0.95 42.2
Latvia 58.2 62.3 54.3 0.87 35.4
Poland 55.1 61.2 49.3 0.81 29.0
Romania 64.2 69.5 59.0 0.85 52.0
Slovenia 62.7 66.7 58.5 0.88 22.3
Slovakia 56.3 61.6 51.1 0.83 21.5
EU average 63.6 73.2 53.9 0.74 38.5
EU maximum 76.4 80.7 72.1 0.89 65.1
EU minimum 53.4 67.6 39.3 0.58 25.0
Source: Eurostat 2001 (candidate countries), OECD 2001 (employment rates for EU). * Ratio of male and female employment rate
In Table 1 we show employment rates of the candidate countries relative to the EU average. In
2000, these were distributed at the lower end of European Union member states. Only the Czech
Republic and Romania could claim employment rates above the EU average in 2000.
Furthermore, the table suggests that the low employment rates in candidate countries are primarily￿8￿
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due to low employment rates of men and older workers, while gender differences are less
pronounced.
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The steep and highly persistent decline in the employment rates in the 1990s brought forth both
reductions in the labour participation rate and increased unemployment. However, the extent to
which these declines contributed to employment losses differed among countries (see: Boeri, Burda
and K￿ll￿, 1989). For instance in Hungary the decline in employment rates from 1989 to 1996
amounted to 22.9 percentage points. Of this, 16.7 percentage points can be explained by
reduced participation and only 6.9 by increased unemployment (see Table 2). In the Czech
Republic and Bulgaria, over half of the decline in employment rates can be explained by declines
in participation. By contrast, in Romania only 0.9 percentage points of the 5.6 percentage point
reduction in employment rates can be explained by reduced participation. Demographics
contributed only modestly to employment declines, from +1.8% (Bulgaria) to ￿1.6% (Slovak
Republic).
Table 2: Breakdown of the decline in employment rates (1989￿96; percent values)
Change in employment
rate
Change in unemployment Change in non-
employment
Change in working age
population
Bulgaria -22.2 9.9 10.5 1.8
Czech Republic -9.6 2.6 8.0 -1.0
Hungary -22.9 6.9 16.7 -0.7
Poland -13.1 9.4 4.6 -1.0
Romania -5.6 6.3 0.9 -1.5
Slovak Republic -11.6 8.4 4.7 -1.6
Source: Burda, Boeri, K￿ll￿ (1998).
The diversity in participation and unemployment rates among candidate countries mirrors the
differences between member states. In 2000, the participation rate of the Czech Republic would
have been the 6th highest among the EU countries if it had been an EU member. Only Denmark,
the UK, Finland, the Netherlands and Germany could claim higher participation rates. By contrast,
Hungary would have ranked second last among the EU countries in 2001 ￿ only Italy had slightly
lower participation rates (see OECD, 2001).
In contrast to EU member states, gender differences in participation are much less pronounced in
candidate countries. In 1997, the country with the lowest share of female labour force in total
labour force among the candidate countries was Romania with 44%. This was still higher than in
some highly developed EU members such as the UK, Germany, Austria or the Netherlands, and it
exceeded levels of southern European countries by far (see Mickiewicz and Bell, 2000). In theory,
the fact that participation rates of women in transition have not declined as rapidly as expected,
can be attributed either to preferences and established social patterns, changing income￿9￿
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opportunities for women or preservation of some elements of generous institutional child care
provision, which was in place at the starting point of transition. In this context, Bonin and Euwals
(2001) find that almost unchanged participation rates of East German women can be attributed to
two opposite tendencies. On the one hand, the high preference of women to participate in the
labour market has been reduced during transition. On the other hand, higher income and the
fertility decline among East Germans induced higher participation rates. Similar evidence is
presented by Saget (1999) for Hungary. He finds that the labour supply decision of women reacts
strongly to own wage but hardly to household income. It suggests that the Hungarian women take
their labour supply decision independently of their household￿s income.
Heterogeneity among candidate countries is also the central theme concerning both the level and
the structure of unemployment (see Table 3). The average unemployment rate in candidate
countries exceeded that of the EU by some 4 percentage points, but a number of countries (notably
Hungary, Romania and Slovenia) could claim levels below the EU average and the Czech
Republic￿s unemployment rate approximately approached the EU average. In a number of other
countries (such as Bulgaria, Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia) unemployment exceeded the
unemployment levels of Spain.
Table 3: Indicators of Unemployment in candidate countries, 2000
Unemployment
rate
Unemployment
rate for men
Unemployment
rate for women
Unemployment
gender gap
Youth
unemployment
Long-term
unemployment
Bulgaria 18.7 19.0 18.3 0.97 27.0 52.8
Czech Republic 8.8 7.4 10.5 0.57 26.0 49.1
Estonia 13.5 15.0 11.8 0.79 25.3 47.4
Hungary 6.6 7.2 5.8 0.81 30.4 47.8
Lithuania 15.9 18.2 13.5 0.74 26.7 52.4
Latvia 14.4 15.3 13.5 0.88 22.8 55.8
Poland 16.6 14.8 18.6 0.74 31.9 44.7
Romania 7.7 8.2 7.1 0.87 19.0 49.2
Slovenia 7.1 6.9 7.2 0.96 19.5 62.7
Slovakia 19.1 19.5 18.6 0.95 17.4 53.8
CEE average 12.5 12.0 13.0 1.08
EU average 8.4 7.2 9.9 0.73 24.0 34.4
EU maximum 14.4 10-0 21.0 2.10 61.1
EU minimum* 2.8 2.1 3.8 1.81 18.9
*Excluding Luxembourg . Source: Regio database, Eurostat.
An analysis of the structure of unemployment reveals further stylised facts:
• As with most other indicators, gender differences in unemployment rates are less pronounced
than in most EU member states. In 2000, the unemployment gender gap in all candidate￿1 0￿
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countries except the Czech Republic was (in part substantially) narrower than in the member
states. This finding is also confirmed by Knogler (2001) who finds that unemployment rates of
men and women were of almost comparable size in all candidate countries except Slovakia in
1994 and have only slightly diverged since then. Despite this, Ham et al. (1999) in a micro-
econometric study show that the higher incidence of unemployment among women in the
Czech and Slovak Republics cannot be explained by differences in characteristics between men
and women and therefore may result from ￿discrimination￿.
 Long term unemployment as a share of total unemployment exceeds EU levels. This, however,
should be put in relation to the higher average unemployment rate in candidate countries.
Mickiewicz and Bell (2000) show that in 1998 the share of long term unemployment of the
Central East European OECD members fitted well with that of current EU Members, after
controlling for the higher unemployment rates. However, both the EU as well as the candidate
countries long term unemployment was high relative to non European OECD members even
after controlling for higher unemployment rates.
 Youth unemployment levels are comparable to the EU member states. This is confirmed by the
analysis of Mickiewicz and Bell (2000) who find that youth unemployment is comparable to the
EU levels, even after controlling for differences in the level of unemployment.
 As in Western Europe, less qualified workers are more likely to experience unemployment (and
in particular long-term unemployment). However, in contrast to many Western European
countries where unemployment risk is steeply declining with educational attainment, there is
some evidence that in candidate countries persons with vocational training are more likely to
become unemployed than other groups (see: Boeri, Burda and K￿ll￿, 1998, Mickiewicz and
Bell, 2000). This could be interpreted as a result of the previous regime which over-invested in
vocational education and the high specificity of vocational training in communist times (see:
Boeri and Keese, 1992).
In particular, the finding of high unemployment risks for workers with vocational training as well as
the fact that, in contrast to popular belief, the educational attainment of the labour force in
candidate countries was not higher than in Western European countries, but rather more focused
on narrow vocational training at the expense of higher education (see Table 4 as well as Boeri,
2001), suggests that education is an increasingly important determinant of labour market success.
This applies both to training of adult workers as well as basic education. There are, however, only
few studies of either the determinants for enrolling in adult education or the change of enrolment
rates of youths in the candidate countries. There are few notable exceptions. Boeri, Burda and
K￿ll￿ (1998), who find that enrolment rates in higher education are still lower in candidate
countries than in the other OECD countries, but that the gap is closing. K￿ll￿ and Kertesi (1999)
present evidence that Hungarian youths are reacting to market incentives by opting for university
education in greater numbers, since returns to human capital have risen. Berger, Earle and￿1 1￿
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Sabirianova (2001) who find that retraining in new fields has higher returns in Russia than in the
US but that there has been a steady and continuous decline in training from 1992 to 2001.
Finally, Micklewright (1999) shows that enrolment rates by social class of parents are similarly
unevenly distributed in the candidate countries as they are in Western Europe. Thus elites in these
countries thus secured similar educational advantages as in the West.
Table 4: Educational attainment of the workforce at the outset of transition (% of labour force)
Primary or lower Vocational Secondary Higher
Bulgaria 44.6 15.8 30.0 9.6
Former CSFR 26.0 21.0 43.8 9.2
Hungary 38.4 23.1 26.9 11.6
Poland 34.2 29.5 27.9 8.4
Romania 35.8 31.4 24.0 8.8
France 35.3 - 46.0 14.6
Netherlands 12.6 - 61.3 19.7
Spain 48.4 - 46.1 5.5
Source: Boeri and Keese (1992).
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Empirical evidence thus suggests that in terms of macro-economic labour market indicators
candidate countries are by and large comparable to the less well performing member states such
as Spain and Italy. This is surprising in the light of parts of the early literature on transition, which
feared long and persistent unemployment. This fear was amongst others driven by the markedly
different institutional framework of candidate countries. Mickiewicz and Bell (2000) characterise the
stylised labour market institutions in socialist countries by four features:
1. The employers of all employees was the state, and dependent employment was the primary
form of earning income. This led to a number of unique institutional features. In particular,
since the state was equivalent to enterprises, a number of social services were administered by
enterprises rather than regional or national bureaucracies.
2. Trade unions in socialism functioned as a ￿transmission mechanism￿ under the control of the
ruling socialist party and had very little real political power in wage negotiations. Employer
organisations did not exist. This implied that wage setting institutions comparable to those of
most market economies and social partnership were non-existent as these economies emerged
from socialism.
3. Unemployment did not exist, the labour code provided rigid employment guarantees and there
were extensive procedural safeguards against changes in pay and working conditions. This
implied that institutions such as unemployment benefits were unknown and that employment
protection tended to be rather stringent.￿1 2￿
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4. Fourth, wage decisions in the socialist system were often oriented towards sectoral levels with
little leeway for enterprise level differences. Wages were more egalitarian than in most mature
market economies (see Freeman 1994). In particular, returns to education tended to be lower
and compensating differentials for bad working conditions such as in mining and heavy
industry higher than in market economies.
Given these institutional differences, it was no surprise that substantial institutional changes had to
occur in the face of transition, and these applied to four fields:
• First, a social security system had to be created to safeguard income for the unemployed.
• Second, wage formation had to be regulated so as to be in accordance with the workings of a
market economy.
• Third, active labour market policy measures had to be designed which would be capable to
help the unemployed to adapt to the changed labour demand.
• Fourth, labour market regulations such as employment protection and minimum wage
legislation had to be newly designed.
Each of these endeavours presented its own tradeoffs. For instance, in the optimal speed of
transition (OST) literature it was often argued that in the face of expected high unemployment rates
at the outset of transition, generous unemployment benefit regimes may be a way to ￿buy￿ political
support for reforms from the unemployed (see: Roland, 1994), while Boeri (2001) argues that the
high unemployment rates in transition can be attributed to excessively generous non-employment
benefits.
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Unemployment benefits, while generous at the beginning of transition, were quickly tightened in the
face of increased fiscal costs (Scarpetta and Reuterswald, 1994). For instance, Mickiewicz and Bell
(2000, p. 162) in a detailed survey of the unemployment benefit system in Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic find that ￿... the real difference between Central and West European countries
is that the former lack the guarantee of long-term or indefinite duration benefits which
characterises EU social policies. In Central European countries replacement rates are relatively
low, duration constrained and initially generous eligibility conditions have been tightened. The
unemployment benefit system can be characterised as relatively restrictive.￿
Boeri, Burda and K￿ll￿ (1999) argue that figures of the registered unemployed relative to
interview-based unemployment measures as those of the Labour Force Surveys are an
encompassing measure of the benefits accruing from the unemployment benefit system. These
benefits may arise from the income support provided by benefits, as well as from access to
employer information, job counselling and manpower training programmes or other benefits (such￿1 3￿
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as health insurance and others) accruing from registering as unemployed. These figures vary
widely. In countries where the ratio of registered unemployment to unemployment measured by
surveys is lower than one (such as the Czech Republic) one can assume that job information
services and benefits attached to unemployment registration are relatively unattractive, while in
countries where the ratio is larger than one (such as Hungary, Poland, Romania or Slovenia) it has
to be assumed that registering as unemployed is associated with substantial additional benefits.
As argued recently by Boeri and Terrel (2002), since unemployment benefits in candidate countries
are in general less generous than in the EU member states and eligibility is shorter, focusing on the
wider category of non-employment benefits (which include welfare benefits, sickness benefits,
active labour market policies and disability benefit as well as unemployment benefits) may be
important. For this reason they calculate the average replacement ratio for a fictitious person who
earned twice or two thirds the average income in candidate countries for two years including all
forms of social assistance which this person will gain. They find that this replacement ratio lies
between 40% and 52% for people earning only two thirds of the average salary.
Table 5: Size of non-employment benefits in candidate countries
Non-employment benefits as
%o fG D P
Average replacement ratio in the first two years of
unemployment of a person earning...
2 times the average wage 2/3 of the average wage
Bulgaria 1.3 18 47
Czech Republic 3.6 21 52
Hungary 2.4 18 50
Poland 5.0 14 46
Romania 1.9 16 40
Source and details of calculation see: Boeri and Terrel (2002).
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As in Western European countries, active labour market policies have been an integral part of
labour market policy in transition. They aim at enhancing flexibility of workers. While results on the
effectiveness of such measures is as ambiguous as in much of the evaluation literature in Western
Europe (see: chapter 3) and budgets for this policy have differed between countries, the bandwidth
of such expenditure seems to be within European bounds. Boeri, Burda and K￿ll￿ (1998)
document that the CEE candidate countries, based on the advice of most international
organisations, have been quick to design and implement a wide variety of active labour market
programs. At the same time within the CEE candidate countries, a gap has opened up between
countries which spend a substantial amount on active labour market policies, such as Slovenia,
Hungary and (relative to the low unemployment rates) the Czech Republic, and countries that have
spent less on active measures such as Bulgaria and Poland (see Boeri, Burda and K￿ll￿ (1998)).￿1 4￿
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Furthermore, the structure of ALMP spending differs compared to Western European countries.
Candidate countries typically spend more on subsidised employment than EU and EFTA countries
and less on all other measures. For instance, Slovenia spent 0.36% of GDP on subsidised
employment and Hungary 0.29% relative to 0.2% in the EU and EFTA countries. In particular,
labour market training expenditure is substantially lower than in the EU. In candidate countries it
amounted to between 0.01% and 0.11% of GDP relative to 0.3% in the EU (see Burda, Boeri and
K￿ll￿, 1998).
Table 6: Spending on labour market programmes, 1998
Country Total spending (as % of GDP) Active spending (as % of GDP) Active spending (% of total
spending on LMPs)
Czech Republic 0.36 0.13 35.7
Hungary 1.01 0.39 38.6
Poland 1.00 0.44 44.4
CEE average 0.79 0.32 39.6
EU average 2.80 1.07 37.7
EU maximum 4.72 1.74 25.9
EU minimum 0.84 0.34 61.1
Source : OECD 2001.
Comparing more recent data from the OECD (2001) employment outlook for the OECD member
countries (see Table 6) with average EU data suggests, however, that candidate countries have
reduced spending on active labour market policy more than EU member states. EU member states
reduced active spending from 1.14% of GDP in 1994 to 1.07% in 1998. In the candidate
countries by contrast, spending fell by 0.15% of GDP from 1993 to 1998. In particular in Hungary
spending on ALMP has been reduced substantially (by 0.25% of GDP). Although this may in part
be explained by declining unemployment rates, by 1998 ALMP spending was comparable to Asian
and North American levels rather than Southern European levels in the three candidate countries
surveyed.
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A detailed study of employment protection legislation among OECD member states including
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland conducted by the OECD (1999) (see table 7) finds that
regulations concerning collective dismissals tend to be higher in the candidate countries than in
most EU member states. In particular notice periods are shorter, definitions of collective dismissals
in general more stringent (starting with fewer than ten persons) and delays before dismissal longer
than the European average (see OECD, 1999). Regulations concerning employment conditions for
temporary work by contrast are substantially more liberal. In particular there are few to no
restriction concerning temporary work, the number of renewals and the maximum cumulated
duration of temporary work contracts (see OECD, 1999). Restrictions on regular employment￿1 5￿
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finally are less stringent only in Belgium, Ireland, the UK and Denmark than in the EU candidate
countries.
This pattern suggests that labour laws in the candidate countries were primarily concerned with
regulating mass redundancy rather than temporary work. This may reflect demand for policy, since
mass redundancies were a common phenomenon in many transition economies, while acceptance
of flexible work arrangements remained low despite the lack of regulation (see Bonin and
Zimmermann, 2000), which in turn may point to more subtle differences in labour market
adjustment in candidate countries. Due to a lack of part-time work, adjustment by hours may be
weaker and quantity adjustments stronger than in EU member states.
Table 7: Indicators concerning the strictness of labour market regulations*
Overall strictness of protection
against dismissals
Overall strictness of mass
redundancy regulations
Regulation of temporary
employment
Overall
strictness
Czech Republic 2.8 4.3 0.5 2.1
Hungary 2.1 3.4 0.6 1.7
Poland 2.2 3.9 1.0 2.0
Austria 2.6 3.3 1.8 2.3
Belgium 1.5 4.1 2.8 2.5
France 2.3 2.1 3.6 2.8
Germany 2.8 3.1 2.3 2.6
Ireland 1.6 2.1 0.3 1.1
Netherlands 3.1 2.8 1.2 2.2
United Kingdom 0.8 2.9 0.3 0.9
Greece 2.4 3.3 4.8 3.5
Italy 2.8 4.1 3.8 3.4
Portugal 4.3 3.6 3 3.7
Spain 2.6 3.1 3.5 3.1
Denmark 1.6 3.1 0.9 1.5
Finland 2.1 2.4 1.9 2.1
Norway 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.6
Sweden 2.8 4.5 1.6 2.6
Source: OECD (1999). * Indicators are composed indicators based on an analysis of various legal stipulations concerning the cited
elements of labour market regulation in the candidate countries. Indicator take on a maximum value of 5 (very strict) and a minimum
value of 0
Boeri, Burda and K￿ll￿ (1998) look at mass redundancy regulations for a more complete set of
candidate countries. This comparison confirms the slightly more stringent mass redundancy
regulations. In particular, most candidate countries stipulate periods of advance notice which may
amount to a maximum of around three months, with only Romania ￿ requiring just 15 days
advance notice and Slovenia ￿ 6 months ￿ as outliers. All countries require consultations with￿1 6￿
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employee representatives before a mass redundancy, minimum severance pays range from one
month￿s wages to over three months and are usually indexed to tenure. Often exceptions exist for
small enterprises. Finally, definitions of mass redundancies start with a reduction of the labour
force by 10%.
Legal stipulations, however, may be only a partial indicator of the severity of mass redundancy
regulations, since enforcement of these regulations may be more important for the real life
flexibility of the labour market. In this context, Boeri and Terrel (2002) argue that enforcement of
these regulations has been weak because of limited court capacity and lacking capacity of labour
inspectorates.
3
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Among the institutions that have changed dramatically during the transition period are the trade
unions and employer unions. Under socialism, trade unions often operated as ￿transmission
mechanisms￿ used to justify and implement wage and social policy, without much open influence
on wage setting, and employer unions did not exist. Starting out from this situation, trade unions
developed in three distinct directions (see Freeman, 1994). The first was that successor unions,
after some modernisation, continued their pattern of activities in the communist era. An example of
such a case is the Czech Republic. In other countries such as Poland, unions are split between
organisations of communist and opposition origins. Finally, in yet another case ￿ that of Hungary ￿
old communist trade unions split, while several new opposition unions formed, leaving a rather
fragmented trade union movement. Employer unions, in contrast to trade unions, did not exist
before transition. This made institutional development of such organisations rather difficult.
Mickiewicz and Bell (2000) argue that many of these organisations are thus still fragmented and
the role of social partners in policy making is small. In this context Vaughan￿Whitehead (1998)
finds that union coverage of wages negotiations is 30% in the Czech Republic and Hungary and
only 13% in Lithuania.
Nonetheless, tripartite organisations of some form exist in all CEE candidate countries. Their
powers and roles in policy making, however, differ across countries as well as time periods. In
general the roles of employer federations and trade unions are weak, however. This is also
documented by strike levels which were high only in Poland in the early 1990s (see Dorenbros,
1999). The EC￿s 2001 regular reports on the candidate countries￿ progress towards accession
similarly comment on the need to strengthen and improve social dialogue for all candidate
countries except Latvia.
3 The European Commission￿s regular reports on progress to accession point out the inadequate capacity of labour
inspectorates in a number of candidate countries.￿1 7￿
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Due to the weak role of trade unions, workers￿ interests in candidate countries were often
represented at the firm level by works councils (see Vaughan-Whitehead 1998). These obtained
substantial power in a number of countries (in particular Poland, Hungary and Slovenia)
4 and
usually had powers not only concerning enterprise wage negotiations but also with respect to the
management of firms. Indeed it can be argued (see Boeri and Terrel, 2002) that low wage
flexibility in some candidate countries resulted from strong works councils rather than strong trade
unions.
Table 8: Minimum wages in candidate countries
Mechanism Adjustment % workers paid minimum
wages
Czech Republic inflation trigger>5% adjusted once
in 1991￿1995
tripartite agreement
Hungary fixed amount, annual adjustment tripartite agreement 3.8% (1997)
Poland quarterly, 1.9 times social minimum labour ministry in consultation with
trade unions
4.5% (1996)
Source: Mickiewicz and Bell, 2000.
An area in which tripartite organisations have some competencies in candidate countries is in
setting minimum wages. In the Vysegrad countries, tripartite organisations either formulate or
consult on minimum wage setting, although details differ (see Table 8). These minimum wages
have declined both in real terms as well as relative to real average wages. For instance, the Czech
Republic￿s minimum wage amounted to 53% of the median wage in 1991 and fell to 21% by
1997, in Hungary the decline was from 45% to 37% before minimum wages were substantially
increased in 1999. Only Polish minimum wages remained nearly unchanged (see OECD, 1998;
Mickiewicz and Bell, 2000). The result of this was that minimum wages were not binding even for
low-skilled workers. For instance Vaughan-Whitehead (1998) finds that in Hungary 10% of the
workforce were working at the minimum wage in 1992 in the competitive spheres of the economy.
In 1995 this number had declined to 2%.
As with mass redundancy regulations, the role of minimum wage regulations may be overrated in
the candidate countries. Thus Boeri and Terrel (2002) argue that although candidate countries
have minimum wages, the reason for the few adjustment made to these was the disinterest of
policy makers, due to low enforceability of these regulations. They argue that in the context of
transition economies, where bargaining institutions are weak and labour inspectors not very
efficient, minimum wages may not be enforceable at all and their primary role may have been to
define social benefits, since a number of these benefits are tied to minimum wage regulations.
4 Interestingly, works councils were relatively weak in former Czechoslovakia.￿1 8￿
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The purpose of this chapter was to determine to what degree candidate countries still differ from
EU member states in terms of labour market institutions and outcomes. Summarising the
comparative literature suggests that relative to the dramatically different starting conditions there
has been substantial convergence towards continental European labour market outcomes in the
last decade.
Concerning most indicators of labour market development, candidate countries are within the
range of EU member states. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity among candidate
countries and a number of particularities remain. First, the long and persistent declines in
employment rates to levels which are in general lower than in the more successful member states
indicates that most candidate countries have not been able to recoup the losses incurred at the
start of transition and may hint at weak job creation as has also been found for some
Mediterranean countries such as Spain. Second, the higher incidence of long-term unemployment,
which ranges in the upper half of the EU member states for all candidate countries, suggests that
the unemployed are a stagnant pool rather than rapidly moving from unemployment to new
employment.
Institutionally there has also been convergence to EU standards. Most countries have opted for a
continental European system of industrial regulations. They have put in place a system of active
labour market policies, developed social partnership and implemented social security reforms. In
the light of these substantial reforms in the last decade, the remaining legal differences between
countries seem gradual rather than fundamental. Candidate countries in general have more severe
mass redundancy regulations but their overall level of labour market regulations does not exceed
Western European levels. Furthermore trade unions and social partnership organisations are
arguably weaker than in many EU countries.
This said, it has to be noted that the scientific debate so far has paid little attention to issues of
enforcement. Judging from the mostly anecdotal evidence and the EC￿s regular reports on
progress to accession, however, enforcement of the social acquis and other labour law-related
regulations seems to be substantially less stringent than in many member states of the EU.￿1 9￿

(	(,			,-
Despite convergence and increased institutional similarity it is undisputed that enlargement of the
European Union will have effects on the candidate countries, and in particular on the candidate
countries￿ labour markets in terms of labour supply, demand and institutions. First, to join the
Union they must take over its complete acquis communautaire. This will impact on both the
competitiveness of candidate countries￿ industries through adoption of ￿ in particular ￿
environmental and competition policy and directly on labour market institutions through the social
acquis. Second, accession will impact on migration, foreign direct investment and trade. Third, the
new member states will become eligible for EU policies, in particular CAP and regional funds.
Fourth, as integration proceeds to European Monetary Union, candidate countries will have to fulfil
the Maastricht criteria, which will impact on their exchange rate, monetary and budgetary policies.
This in turn will have implications for the labour market, to the extent that these policies were
previously used to accommodate cyclical fluctuations and are now no longer available.
Aside from these ￿comparative static￿ considerations, accession also has implications on the
incentives for political decision makers in the countries joining the Union. For instance, Clamfors
(2001) recently argued that in a monetary union, where wage negotiations and labour market
institutions are set nationally, incentives for labour market reforms may be lower than in a situation
where each country has a currency of its own. When many countries decide on labour market
institutions simultaneously and monetary policy is set at a supra-national level, each individual
country will ignore the impact of its policy on (European-wide) inflation rates. In a situation where
monetary policy is decided upon by national policy makers, by contrast, the interaction of wage
and monetary policy will be internalised. Thus moving into EMU may increase the chance of co-
ordination failure between monetary and income policy.
The accession of candidate countries may also change the incentives of European institutions in
various ways. This is particularly relevant in the context of structural funds policy and European
labour market and social policy since these are currently changing at the fastest pace. For
instance, EPRC (2001) recently suggested that regional problems in candidate countries may
require different policy approaches than are currently used in the EU; and Perotti (2001) argues
that in a common market area where regional transfers are available to support poorer member
states and migration is possible between countries, rich members could decide to pay higher
transfers to poorer members to avoid immigration to their respective countries. Finally, it has to be
expected that once candidate countries join the Union they will raise their own interests in major
European policy debates. This will to some degree influence the outcomes of these debates and
the evolution of European policies in a way that is not easily foreseeable at present.￿2 0￿
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At the institutional level, accession means in principle accepting the complete acquis
communautaire although transitional arrangements (noteably concerning the freedom of
movement of labour and services) have been negotiated. This may have both positive as well as
negative effects on labour markets. A positive effect is that its adoption will in all likelihood add to
the institutional quality in the candidate countries (see Delhey, 2001). This can be expected
because current EU member states belong to the most highly developed when it comes to
institutional quality.
5 This in turn may increase long-term growth prospects both because of higher
internal growth and additional foreign direct investment (see below).
On the negative side, the acquis consists of a number of stipulations which may increase
production costs and may thus reduce competitiveness of candidate country￿s industries. This
applies in particular to environmental regulations but also to areas of competition policy (see, e.g.,
EPRC, 2001). This in turn may lead to smaller employment growth ￿ at least in the short run ￿
particularly in sectors which are heavily affected by such regulations or which were previously
sheltered from international competition.
Furthermore, as recently warned by Burda (1998), adoption of the social acquis could damage the
CEEC￿s labour market flexibility if they adopt the inflexible institutional set-up of some of the EU
countries upon their accession. Although this may seem somewhat strong given the current nature
of the social acquis in the European Union
6, it may still involve substantial costs. Feldmann (1999)
for instance criticises the guideline on working hours, which stipulates a weekly maximum of 48
working hours and a minimum of four weeks of paid vacations. He argues that this reduced labour
market flexibility and presents evidence that its implementation would have increased wage cost by
more than 0.5% in the UK. Furthermore, he argues that the current stipulations concerning cross-
border provision of services operate to protect the current rich member states of the Union from
competition by poor countries, by preventing them from using their comparative advantage. A fact
which tends to augment the benevolent interpretation of the social acquis (Boeri, Burda and K￿ll￿,
1998) that it defines a set of common social standards, by a more cynical one which holds that it
represents an attempt of the rich member states to export part of their labour market rigidities to
avoid competition from the poorer member states.
5 In the IMF (2000) ranking of institutional quality, EU member states rank among the upper quintile, while candidate
countries are predominantly ranked in the second quintile.
6 According to Belke and Hebler (2001), transforming the social acquis will require the adoption of nine commission
guidelines. Mayr (2001) in a recent case study of the Austrian experience identifies 16 European guidelines which had a
direct impact on Austrian labour law after accession.￿2 1￿
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A further issue concerning the impact of the social acquis is its rapid development. This, on the one
hand, makes it clear that accession and adoption of the acquis aims at moving targets. On the
other hand, it opens the door for speculation regarding the self-interests of candidate countries
concerning the development of European Union social and labour market policy. Belke and Hebler
(2002) argue that, given that the comparative advantages of the poorer member states are already
regulated by the Commission, this may result in accession candidate countries showing a greater
interest in Union-wide social and labour market policies in order to achieve increased social
cohesion. Alternatively, if the new poorer member states indeed view the social acquis as a cynical
attempt by richer member states to insulate themselves against competition, lobbying to loosen the
current regulations may be an alternative option.
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European integration surpasses current attempts at regional integration in other continents through
the process of monetary integration. Integration of the candidate countries will not end with their
accession to the EU, but will proceed on to monetary integration. Countries should thus pursue
Euro membership, under the acquis they must treat their exchange rate policy as a matter of
common interest and adhere to the aims of EMU; eventually adopting the Euro - i.e. no more opt-
outs will be allowed. Although this may impose some further institutional constraints, joining the
EMU may not be immediate. Formally, it will require the countries to first enter the single market
area (based on the Copenhagen criteria), after this candidate countries may apply for ERMII
membership. Final membership in the EMU will then require compliance with Maastricht
convergence criteria as well as exchange rate fluctuations which do not exceed the normal
bandwidth of ERMII (15%) for a period of two years (see Boone, Maurel and Babetski, 2002).
While candidate countries can prolong application for membership in the ERMII some time and
bandwidths are relatively broad, so that major repercussions on the labour market may not be
expected, compliance with the Maastricht criteria may be important because the strict criteria on
budget spending, inflation and public debt as well as interest rates imply a certain macro-
economic policy that may have adverse labour market effects in the candidate countries, in
particular when these goals are implemented rapidly. In this context Boone, Maurel and Babetski
(2002) find that none of the candidate countries can fully comply with these criteria. Furthermore,
the monetary acquis requires a minimum amount of central bank independence, complete
liberalisation of the capital flows, and it limits the role of government financing through central
banks (see Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1999).
The economic rationale of applying the Maastricht convergence criteria to the candidate countries
may, however, be questioned. The reason for this is that the high level of inflation in these
countries reflects the transition process. As long as growth in these countries is expected to be
higher than in member states, keeping inflation low at the same time as fixing nominal exchange
rates is not a feasible option (see Gros, 2000). An alternative criterion ￿ with better economic￿2 2￿
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foundations ￿ for assessing the capability may be provided by the contention of the optimal
currency area theory (see Mundell, 1961) according to which countries sharing similar (symmetric)
shocks are better candidates for a monetary union than countries which have highly dissimilar
(asymmetric) shocks. The reason is that after joining a monetary union countries will lose the option
to adjust to asymmetric shocks through exchange rate mechanisms and thus in the absence of
price (and wage) flexibility, as well as lacking mobility, the likelihood increases that such shocks will
have to be borne by the labour market.
7
Empirical evidence, however, suggests substantial asymmetries of shocks between the European
Union and candidate countries. Although Boone, Maurel and Babetski (2002) find some evidence
of convergence of shocks, Horvath (2002), using the methods applied by Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1992), finds substantial asymmetries between candidate countries and EU member
states. This suggests that the candidate countries do not form an optimum currency area as defined
by the optimum currency area theory.
8
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The system of regional redistribution practised in the European Union encompasses both the
structural and the cohesion funds. Furthermore, the CAP has important implications for the
regional distribution of funds. With accession, the candidate countries will become eligible for
additional finances for regional policy in the framework of structural funds. In its pre-accession
strategy, the European Commission earmarked ￿ 45 billion to be paid to newly acceding
members until 2006, while a recent Dutch study (IBO, 2000) suggests that funds may exceed this
limit if candidate countries join early and are awarded more than the current 4% limit of GDP. This
additional expenditure is high for the candidate countries. For agricultural policy, the commission
foresees that the candidate countries will not become CAP members immediately after their
accession, but will be ￿phased into￿ direct payments (see Belke and Hebler, 2002, and EC 2002).
Recent empirical research on the impact of regional funds on existing member states suggests that
the likely effect depends heavily on their judicial use. A number of studies (e.g. European
Integration Consortium, 2001; EPRC, 2002) find that regional funds have been most effective in
improving backwardness when used to finance investments in education and more encompassing
regional development strategies, while for some countries the impact of regional funds seems to
7 Related to OCA approaches a number of pertinent questions aris which are beyond the scope of this survey in
particular the issues are wheather the EU 15 itself is an OCA and if yes, to what extent is that because of integration? If
no, how important is this and how will the consequences be exacerbated by enlargement? To what extent will the
integration process itself promote greater symmetry? (see Maurel and Batesky, 2002 for a detailed treatment.
8 A wide number of results, however, also suggests that current EMU member states may not be an optimum currency
area either.￿2 3￿
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have been more disappointing (see Tondl, 2001). Thus if regional funds are well used they could
represent a substantial change for regional development and labour markets.
There are, however, a number of doubts concerning the effective use of regional funds given the
current institutional setup of regional policy in the candidate countries. In general, current national
funds for regional policy are low; as is experience with administering such large amounts for
regional policy (see Huber and Palme, 2001). Furthermore, Szemler (2000) criticises the current
regional policy in candidate countries for a) not having developed strategic objectives and
corresponding policy tools as usual in the current member states, and b) not having developed
institutional infrastructures to cope with the influx of funds. Doubts have also been raised because:
• the regional units in many of the candidate countries are relatively new (Poland, Hungary,
Slovakia and the Czech Republic have undergone substantial changes in their regionalisation)
and the associated regional administrations may thus be relatively inexperienced (see Szalavets,
2001);
• given that candidate countries may join the European Union by 2004 this will mean that funds
will have to be spent relatively quickly, which in turn calls for speed in programming the
expenditures. Given the experience with other EU countries ￿ which do not like to leave funds
unused ￿ this may lead to a situation where substantial financial resources are chasing few
high-quality regional development programmes (Huber and Palme, 2001).
In consequence, although access to regional funds holds a potential for major development
impulses for the candidate countries, their judicial use should be prepared in advance of accession
and technical assistance has to be provided to candidate countries to prepare for the use of funds.
9
This is clearly mentioned by the European Commission (see EC, 2001).
Regional policy, however, may in itself be the subject of reform in the next programming period as
a consequence of enlargement. As noted by the Commission (2001), accession poses challenges
to European regional policy that stem from increased regional disparities and thus higher demands
on regional funds on the one side and limited financial resources on the other. The report
discusses a number of options for future regional policy. In particular it suggests that changing
thresholds for eligibility for funds, indirect zoning of funds other than objective ones, increasing
additional requirements, fading-in of new accession candidates countries and increasing the
contribution by other community policies to the goal of social and economic cohesion are options
that have to be discussed for the next programming period (see EC, 2001).
9 In its regular reports on progress towards accession for the candidate countries, the European Commission repeatedly
states that in many countries little progress has been made concerning regional policies and structural funds or that
administrative capacities and implementation have to be improved.￿2 4￿
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In the decade of 1988 to 1998, European Union trade with the CEE countries has increased by a
factor of 6.5, from 1993 to 1998 the increase still amounted to 158%. This raises the issue of
whether further trade increases can be expected after accession. A large bulk of literature has
attempted to estimate the potential trade volumes that could be achieved by integration of the
candidate countries. By and large this literature (see Baldwin,1994; Brenton and Di Mauro, 1998;
Brenton and Gros, 1997) concludes that further increases will not be large, since most of the trade
liberalisation has already been achieved by the Europe agreements. More recently, however,
Schumacher and Tr￿bswetter (2000), arguing that the use of current exchange rates as a
determinant of potential trade reduces the predicative power of existing models and that using
GDP at PPP is a better choice, find that a further increase of 60% to 70% could be expected.
Expectations concerning the future potential of trade in an enlarged Union are thus divergent (see
also Breuss and Egger, 2000) . Studies, however, agree that export growth should continue, at
least to the degree that accession will increase GDP growth.
One reason to believe that intra-EU trade will increase despite tariff convergence is that
enlargement of the EU will abolish a number of non-tariff trade barriers which still exist with
candidate countries. Daly and Kuwahara (1999) find that non-tariff trade barriers are still of some
relevance in EU candidate countries￿ trade relationships while Daly and Kuwahara, Vanags find
"on balance external tariffs are lower in Latvia than in the EU".. Brenton et al. (2000) look at the
importance of technical barriers to trade in the European Union for CEE exports to the EU. They
find that in the more advanced candidate countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic
and Poland) in general less than 20% of trade occurs in products which are not subjected to
technical trade barriers. In the less advanced candidate countries this share may be greater than
35%. Furthermore, Brenton et al. (2000) find that candidate countries have revealed comparative
advantages primarily in products which fall under ￿new approach￿ regulations (i.e. general
guidelines only) concerning technical barriers to trade. This suggests that imports of these products
from the candidate countries to the EU should rise after integration. Finally, Fink (2000) documents
that in the past candidate countries have reacted to balance of payments problems by increasing
non-tariff trade barriers, technical barriers to trade and labelling requirements in an attempt to
shelter markets. This has tended to make the relevance of these barriers to trade greater rather
than smaller in the last decade.
Furthermore, for goods not covered by the Europe agreements changes are undisputed. This
applies in particular to trade with agricultural products and cross-border provision of services (see
Mayerhofer and Palme, 2001). This is also confirmed by estimates from gravity models by Fidrmuc,
Huber and Michalek (2001) who find that trade with EU partners in food and agricultural products
may increase by up to 5% annually in the decade after accession.￿2 5￿
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Intra-EU trade, however, is only one aspect of the trade effects of European integration. Accession
to the Union will also imply application of the external tariffs of the EU. In this context Daly and
Kuwahara (1999) find that external tariffs in Hungary exceed EU external tariff in almost all
products, but that the size of the differences closely follows protection within the EU. Based on a
gravity model, Fidrmuc, Huber and Michalek (2001) find that trade of Poland with other transition
economies in 1996 exceeded the level that could be expected from EU member states with similar
characteristics. This suggests that with integration some trade may be diverted from intra-candidate
country trade to EU trade or trade with the rest of the world. Trade with ￿the rest of the world￿ by
contrast is still below the level of that of similar EU countries, suggesting an increase in the future.
The projected increases in trade are small, however, in comparison to the potential structural
effects. For a number of more narrowly defined commodities, in particular, agricultural
commodities, import growth or decline could exceed the 10% threshold (see Fidrmuc, Huber and
Michalek, 2001). Integration-induced intra-EU trade will thus mainly reinforce the necessity for
internal restructuring already present in the candidate countries. In particular industries that have
so far been sheltered from international competition will find themselves exposed to additional
competition and may experience some structural problems. This in turn may have an impact on the
labour market. Aarle and Skuratowicz (2000) find that increasing exports to the EU had a positive
effect on employment in candidate countries, while higher imports reduced employment and
increased the likelihood of unemployment. Furthermore according to Aarle and Skuratiwicz (2000),
higher import growth has a negative impact on investment and export growth induces additional
investments.
0",	
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There are also several theoretical arguments to suggest that the volume of FDI to candidate
countries may rise with accession. In particular, by providing a more stable and reliable
institutional as well as macro-economic environment, accession will reduce risk premiums in the
candidate countries, improve accessibility to international capital markets and foster the investment
climate. In consequence, most studies forecasting the effects of European integration on economic
growth in the European Union argue that effects from foreign direct investments in the candidate
countries will be an important (if not the most important) source of growth for these countries (see
Baldwin, Fracois and Portes 1997; Keuschnigg and Kohler; 1998, Breuss, 2001). This assumption
is also supported by some empirical work on the accession of both Portugal and Spain to the
European Union (see Martin and Velazquez, 1997), and a number of authors (Dostal, 1999, for
the Czech Republic; and Fazekas, 2000, for Hungary) have found a positive impact of foreign
direct investments on regional development and on the regional labour market situation in
candidate countries.
Estimates of gravity models of FDI (Brenton, Di Mauro and L￿cke, 1999; and Emerson and Gros,
1998) by contrast suggest that the volume of FDI flows into candidate countries have already￿2 6￿
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reached the level that can be expected from their current GDP levels. Di Mauro (2000) analyses
FDI behaviour by means of a gravity equation and finds that non-tariff trade barriers have a
significant negative effect on bilateral FDI, while tariffs have no significant impact. This suggests
that the reduction in non-tariff trade barriers may also give an impetus to foreign direct investments
in the candidate countries. Furthermore, Di Mauro (2000) shows that, in aggregate, trade and FDI
are complements rather than substitutes. This implies that as trade with candidate countries
increases so should FDI.
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"
Furthermore European Integration incorporates elements of labour market integration. One of the
four freedoms guaranteed in the acquis is the freedom of movement of labour. This will have
effects on receiving (member) countries as well as sending candidate countries. Estimates of the
￿migration potential￿ (see, e.g., European Integration Consortium, 2001), while burdened with
methodological problems (see Alecke et al., 2001; and Fertig and Schmidt, 2000), suggest that a
realistic scenario for emigration from the candidate countries may be 0.7% of the EU population in
the long run. Also there is substantial evidence that migration flows have a distinctly structural
component. In general, the formal educational attainment of migrants from the CEECs is higher
than that of previous migrants to most European Union countries, and candidate countries￿
migrants tend to cluster in particular regions of the receiving countries.
While the literature on the effects of this migration on the receiving countries has been burgeoning
in the last decade (see Borjas, 1999, for a survey), few to no studies have looked at the
consequences of migration on the sending countries. Focusing on this issue is of some importance,
since there is a clear regional and educational dimension to migration processes in the candidate
countries. Thus, Kaczmarczyk and Okolski (2002) show that emigrants from Poland to a large
degree come from Silesia and that the educational attainment of such migrants has been falling
over the last decade. Although the overall migration potential in the candidate countries thus may
not be large, isolated regional and/or sectoral problems may arise in these countries as well.
There are, however, other important ways in which migration could be affected through accession
to the European Union. On the one hand, accession could raise the incentives for third-country
citizen to migrate to the candidate countries, either for reasons of transit migration to other EU
member states or for reasons associated with the higher standard of living in EU countries.
10 On
the other hand, institutional changes may reduce current migration forms such as short-term
migration, which accounts for a substantial fraction of third-country migration to the candidate
countries (see Wallace and Stola, 2001).
10 Most candidate countries are already net immigration countries (see Lubyova 2002).￿2 7￿
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The central focus of this chapter was to identify sources of changes in the candidate countries
which will be triggered by accession to the European Union. We identified three sources through
which such ￿shocks￿ may occur. First, institutional changes triggered by adopting the social acquis,
environmental and competition policy as well as ￿ probably at a later stage ￿ accession to EMU,
second the impact of the EU￿s structural policy on the candidate countries, third changes in trade,
foreign direct investments and migration. We find that the literature is far from unanimous in
assessing the consequences of most of these changes for the economic structure. It is thus probably
still too early to give a final assessment on the effects of these changes.
The literature is almost unanimous, however, in that accession of the candidate countries is a win-
win situation in terms of macroeconomic outcomes. Macro-economic models in general suggest
that the welfare of candidate as well as member states will increase due to accession. This,
however, does not automatically imply that all population groups, industries and regions will profit
equally from enlargement. Furthermore, while most of the changes will yield positive long-term
returns for the candidate countries, and an alternative scenario without integration does not seem
to be feasible, in the short run adaptation to the fiercer competitive environment in the European
Union may cause some adjustment costs.
Indeed a substantial part of the evidence gathered in this chapter points to an uneven distribution
of costs and benefits of enlargement. This applies to potential industrial differentiation, with
adjustment costs probably larger in more protected industries and/or monopolies, regional
differentiation which may come through industrial specialisation and the vicinity to borders in areas
like cross-border service provision and commuting, as well as personal differences with potential
changes in income distribution triggered by FDI, trade and migration.
Finally, the literature is also agreed that the benefits of enlargement for candidate countries will not
accrue automatically but that policy has an important role to play in determining the speed and
extent to which these benefits will materialise. This applies in particular to issues of the use of EU
structural funds, but may equally well be assumed for competition policy and other aspects of the
acquis which will change the institutional setup of economies in candidate countries.￿2 8￿
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Accession to the European Union will thus confront CEE candidate countries with a series of shocks
to both labour demand (FDI, trade), supply (migration) and institutions. Given that the size of these
shocks cannot be predicted with precision, interest is focused on the flexibility of labour markets,
i.e. the way in which these countries absorb these shocks. Indeed, ￿flexibility￿ is one of the central
concerns of labour market analysis. Inflexibility of labour markets has been made responsible for
the existence of unemployment in the first place, for its continued rise over the last two decades
and for the European unemployment problem in general. Yet, labour market ￿flexibility￿ is also one
of its most elusive concepts of economics.
In a microeconomic context the labour market may be seen as an impersonal mechanism serving
the purpose of allocating resources to their most productive use. At any time in a given economy,
there are always employers that are reducing employment, while others are increasing their labour
force. In the face of such structural change, labour market flexibility refers to the capability of
workers to move between jobs, which may be located in different regions or may require different
skills. In this view, the inability of workers to adapt to such structural shocks (Lilien, 1982) increases
unemployment. In consequence, net flows of workers between labour market states (unemployed,
employed or out of the labour force) are central indicators of labour market flexibility (Clark and
Summers, 1979). The hypothesis underlying this approach is that proper evaluation of
unemployment should also consider measures of affectedness since even countries with very similar
unemployment rates could behave very differently in terms of mobility (see Blanchard and Portugal,
1998).
In a macroeconomic sense, the economy as a whole is subject to repeated shocks to aggregate
labour demand and supply. The economy thus must be capable of absorbing these shocks by
means of either price (wage) or quantity adjustments (in the form of changes in supply or demand).
The speed at which such shocks are absorbed is termed flexibility. In principle in the face of an
adverse shock to, say, labour demand there are only two ways by which an economy can adjust.
Either relative prices for labour fall (real wage flexibility) to equilibrate the labour market or
quantities adjust by increasing unemployment, migration to other regions or alternatively by a
change in the participation rate (see Pissarides, 1996; and Hall, 1998). In this analysis, the focus
shifts to the statistical analysis of dynamic systems to identify the reaction of specific labour market
variables to specific shocks to the environment. In this chapter we focus on the micro- and macro-
economic literature concerning labour market flexibility. In particular we review the literature on
gross job and worker flows, labour supply and demand and studies of wage determination as well
as the limited evidence on macro-economic wage adjustment mechanisms and migration.￿2 9￿
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A wide range of studies looks at the process through which jobs are created and destroyed on the
firm level in western Europe (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999, for a recent survey). These studies
have delivered a number of ￿stylised facts￿ concerning job creation and destruction processes in
mature market economies. In particular according to Davis and Haltiwanger (1999):
• The studies show that job creation and destruction processes are substantial. Around 10% of
the jobs in an economy are destroyed within a year and approximately the same number is
newly created.
• There is substantial intra-industry churning of jobs ￿ even when moving to very detailed
industrial categories, firm-level job creation and destruction processes surpass net employment
changes by more than 15%.
In addition to these ￿job flows￿ there are also worker flows. In restructuring economies, workers
have to move between jobs. Again studies which have focused on these flows have found a
number of relatively stable facts across most Western European economies, in particular:
• Worker flows exceed job flows substantially. Some studies (see Abowd et al. , 1999) find that
for every newly created job three workers are hired and two leave the firm.
• As with job flows there is thus substantial churning in the labour force.
Early theoretical contributions to the optimal speed of transition (OST) literature expected
substantial structural change. These models made a number of common assumptions and
generated a number of predictions (see Boeri, 2000) concerning micro-economic adjustment.
Most models assumed that moving from the growing to the shrinking sector could be achieved only
by an intermittent spell of unemployment and that the supply of labour in restructuring economies
was fixed. In this setting models predicted that unemployment would rise due to inflow rates into
unemployment being higher than in western economies, while outflow rates from unemployment
would rise after a short time. Equally it was expected that, due to restructuring, job creation and
job destruction should exceed Western European measures.
While unemployment rates as expected increased rapidly (with the notable exception of the Czech
Republic and the Russian Federation) and structural change in terms of sectoral composition,
ownership structure and firm size (see chapter 4) was substantial, the empirical literature on job
and worker flows in candidate countries has found a number of contradictions to the predictions of
the original models. In particular these studies tend to find that:
a) Worker flows are relatively low in the transition countries. For instance Boeri and Flinn (1999)
find that mobility rates of workers across sectors and occupations in Poland and Hungary are
substantially lower than in Italy, which itself is considered a relatively inflexible labour market.
Bell (2001) finds that transition rates in Poland have remained low throughout the transition up￿3 0￿
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to 1998. This is in contrast to theoretical predictions which suggest higher restructuring needs
and thus larger flows in the candidate countries than in the European Union.
b) In general labour market problems in candidate countries seem to be more strongly associated
with a low probability of escape from unemployment rather than high flows into
unemployment. For example Storm and Terrel (2000) find that transition probabilities from
unemployment to employment and those from out of the labour force to employment are much
lower in the candidate countries than in the US. They range between 20% to 60% of total flows
in candidate countries rather than 70% in the US. Again this is in direct contradiction to the
original hypothesis of high inflow rates to unemployment and (at least soon after the start of
transition) equally high outflow rates.
c) Flows into inactivity have represented a substantial part of the adjustment mechanism of labour
markets. This is again supported by evidence in Storm and Terrel (2000) who show that in all
candidate countries (except the Czech and Slovak Republics) the share of flows from
employment to the out-of-labour force exceeds that in the US, and by Boeri (2001) who reports
flows from employment to inactivity that were twice as large as those from employment to
unemployment in Poland in 1992/1993. This finding puts to question whether the assumptions
in the original models can be upheld, since the possibility of moving into inactivity was
completely neglected in the original models.
d) A substantial part of labour market flows occurred directly from state-sector to private-sector
employment without an intermittent spell of unemployment. Boeri (2001), for instance, once
more suggests that large direct shifts from state- to private-sector employment occurred without
intervening unemployment spells. Again this calls to question the assumption of the original
models which ruled out direct transitions from the state to the private sector.
e) High rates of simultaneous job creation and job destruction were a short-lived phenomenon in
candidate countries. While early work on job creation and destruction (see Konings et al.,
1996; Konings and Bilsen, 1997) supports the hypothesis of restructuring, since job creation
was much more concentrated on growing sectors and much of the job creation centred on
small and private firms,
11 more recent evidence suggests that many of these particularities
have disappeared in the more advanced candidate countries. In particular Faggio and Konings
(2001) report job creation and destruction rates for both Poland and Slovenia for the period
between 1994 and 1997 which are comparable to Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. In
11 Bilsen and Konings (1997) find that de novo firms have been the most important in job creation in Hungary in the
period between 1991 and 1993. For Estonia, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (1999) report job destruction rates of around
12.9% of the employed but job creation rates of only 9.7% for the period of 1992￿94. The estimates of job destruction
presented in the papers by Konings et al. and Bilsen and Konings (1997) range from 18% in Poland to 9.1% in Hungary.
Comparing these figures to those of member states of the European Union (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999) suggests
that job creation is somewhat lower.￿3 1￿
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a similar vein, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (1999) find that in Estonia job creation and
destruction, starting from low levels, surged in the early phases but reached levels comparable
to those of most western countries by 1994. This again is somewhat in contradiction to the
early expectations, which suggested that job creation would continue for a longer period of
time.
Table 9: Studies of job and worker flows in transition
Authors Countries Data Findings
Terrel and Storm (2000) Czech R. LFS 1994￿98 - Transition was accompanied by substantial job-to-job moves
and low flows from in and out of employment
Storm and Terrel (1997) Czech R. LFS 1994￿95 - The probability of staying unemployed for a year is 0.95
which is only slightly lower than staying out of the labour force
for one year
Jurajda and Terrel (2000) Czech R. Household Survey - Over 70% of all worker flows are job-to-job
￿ Exits from the old sector are primarily to the new sector
(43%). New sector exits go primarily to the new sector (31%)
Jurajda and Terrel (2002) Estonia
Czech
Republic
Retrospective
question in LFS
- Job reallocation occurs from ￿old￿ state enterprises to small
new firms
Faggio and Konings (2001) Poland
Estonia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Romania
Company
accounts
(Amadeus) 1993￿
97
- Gross job flows are 8% in Poland ,13￿18% in Estonia, 8￿
10% in Slovenia, 6￿11% in Bulgaria, 10￿14% in Romania
Bilsen and Konings (1997) Bulgaria
Hungary
Romania
Company
accounts
(Amadeus) 1993￿
94
- Job reallocation is highest in Bulgaria (8￿14%) and lowest in
Romania (7￿10%)
- De novo firms account for most of the job creation and little
of job destruction. The opposite is true for privatised firms
Newell and Pastore (2000) Poland LFS 1995 - Regions with high inflow rates to unemployment are also high
unemployment regions, outflow rates determine less of the
unemployment rate
Gora and Lehmann (1994) Poland LFS 1993 - Diversified regions also have the highest churning in labour
market flows
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec
(1999)
Estonia Retrospective
question in 1995
LFS
- Job creation increased from 0.5% in 1989 to 11% in 1993
and 1994, job destruction from 1.5% to around 10%
- Private firms account for the majority of job creation, but
have substantial job destruction too
Boeri and Flinn (1997) Poland
Hungary
Slovak R.
LFS 1992￿97 - Mobility across sectors and occupations is lower in all
countries than in Italy
￿ Sectoral as well as occupational mobility is highest among
candidate countries in Poland and lower in the Slovak Republic
and Hungary
Boeri (1995) Bulgaria
Czech R.
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R.
OECD Database
1992-94
- Outflows to employment per unemployed range from 1% in
Bulgaria to 5% in Hungary. Only the Czech Republic is an
outlier with 15.3%
Source: own research.
A number of authors have also noticed that worker flows in candidate countries are associated with
regional disparities. Svenar et al. (1994), in analysing unemployment flows in 1992 and 1993 in
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, find that outflows from unemployment are explained by labour
demand factors, while inflows depend strongly on structural characteristics of regions. Lehmann
and Gora (1995) find that in Poland from 1992 to 1994 flows from unemployment to employment￿3 2￿
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differed significantly in diversified regions, while Newell and Pastore (2000) suggest that high
unemployment regions in Poland are also regions with high inflow rates to unemployment, whereas
outflow rates are low but relatively evenly distributed across regions.
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Low escape probabilities from unemployment and important flows from in and out of inactivity
have led Boeri (2001) to criticise original models of the optimal speed of transition for their neglect
of the labour supply decision of individuals. He argues that incorporating the disincentive effects of
non-employment benefits (welfare payments, expenditures for active labour market policies,
sickness and disability support as well as unemployment benefits) and potential subsistence income
could account for the substantial inflexibility of the labour markets in the candidate countries.
Table 10: Studies of the impact of passive labour market policies
Authors Countries Findings
Ham et al. (1995) Czech Republic
Slovakia
- Elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to unemployment benefits is
between 0.41 and 0.56 in the Czech Republic
- Elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to entitlement is between 0.30
and 0.45 in the Czech Republic and between 0.18 and 0.39 in Slovakia
- Elasticities are comparable to values found in Western Europe (Norway and UK)
Lubyova and van Ours (1997) Slovakia - Despite replacement ratios ranging to above 100% for individual groups (low
educated and unemployed with young children) no disincentive effects in job
finding rates are found for unemployment benefits
Lubyova and van Ours (1999) Slovakia - No disincentive effects on unemployment duration is found for unemployment
benefits
Micklewright and Nagy (1995) Hungary - Unemployed react inelastically to expiry of unemployment benefit
Micklewright and Nagy
(1995a)
Hungary - Probability of employment does not differ between recipients of social welfare
and non-receivers
Galasi (1999) Hungary - Benefits increase reservation wages but benefit receivers also search more
intensively
Nagy (2000) Hungary - Expiring unemployment benefits have no effect on the probability to move to
employment
Galasi and Nagy (2001) Hungary - 20 percentage points decrease in benefit receipts had only a marginal effect in
exit to job hazards
Wolf (1997) Hungary - Expiry of unemployment benefits has only a small (but significant) impact on the
???
Gora (1995 and 1997) Poland - The regulations on unemployment benefits increased the labour supply in
Poland
Gora and Lehmann (1995) Poland - Lax eligibility rules at the beginning of transition have led to crowding in of
unemployed
Puhani (1996) Poland - Spell length is increased by higher unemployment payments
Studies based on regional data
K￿ll￿ (2001) Hungary
(selected
regions)
- Weak evidence for the size of the black economy to reduce outflow rates. There
is, however, great heterogeneity in dynamics even among the analysed regions
K￿ll￿ and Vincze (1999) Hungary
Romania
- Higher flows into selfemployment are registered in depressed regions. Flows
from selfemployment to employment are not higher in regions with high
employment growth
Source: own research.￿3 3￿
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Empirical evidence concerning the connection between these income components and labour
supply is mixed, however. The incentive effects of unemployment benefits are still disputed.
Micklewright and Nagy (1995) find that unemployment in Hungary is relatively inelastic to changes
in unemployment benefit entitlements. In contrast, Wolf (1997), using the same data set, finds
small but significant effects. Thus a less generous unemployment benefit system reduces the hazard
rate for exits from unemployment. Galasi (1999), looking at reservation wages and search
activities of unemployed, presents evidence that benefits and non-labour income increase the
reservation wage of unemployed, but this effect is partly offset by higher search activities of
unemployed with higher alternative income.
In 2000, following a further cut of unemployment benefit duration and replacement ratio, Nagy
(2000) repeated the two-cohorts survival analysis he had done with Micklewright in 1992￿93
(Mickewright and Nagy 1995). Again, he found no effect. The exit to job hazards of the cohorts
entering unemployment right before/after the reform were statistically indistinguishable.
Furthermore, Galasi and Nagy (2001) looked at the effect of tightening unemployment assistance
(lower flat-rate benefit, obligation to participate in public works, mortgaging the real estate of
recipients). They followed two cohorts entering right before/after the reform, and found a
substantial decrease in benefit payments (by about 20 percentage points) but only marginal
improvement in the exit to job hazards. K￿ll￿ (2000), estimating the exit to job probabilities of
unemployment benefit recipients in a one-month period (March-April 2001), found that time to
exhaustion had a significant impact on job finding but the effect was high only with skilled
unemployment benefit recipients (those with at least secondary education).
For Poland, Gora and Lehman (1995) as well as Gora (1995 and 1997) argue that the originally
very generous entitlements schemes of Polish unemployment benefits attracted substantial flows of
persons, which should properly have been considered out-of-labour force. Thus unemployment
benefits increased registered unemployment through increasing measured labour demand.
Similarly, Puhani (1996) finds that the spell length is significantly increased by higher
unemployment benefit entitlements. Finally, Ham Svejnar and Terrel (1995) report that the elasticity
of unemployment duration with respect to unemployment benefits is smaller in Slovakia (0.1) and
higher in the Czech Republic (0.41￿0.56) than in Western European countries. The elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to entitlement is between 0.18 and 0.39 for Slovakia and
between 0.30 and 0.40 in the Czech Republic.
Again this evidence is augmented by findings on regional evolutions. K￿ll￿ (2001) for instance
conducts a detailed study of labour market adjustments in the least developed regions of Hungary,
which have experienced the most massive declines in participation rates. He finds that exit to job
probabilities have not been strongly affected by benefit receipt, although he cannot preclude the
possibility of more complex interactions through minimum wages. However, he finds weak
evidence of the size of the black economy having reduced outflow to jobs and of access to high
quality land increasing reservation wages. In general, however, even within regions with high non-￿3 4￿
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employment rates, exit to job rates vary substantially, from very high to extremely low in
comparison to other Hungarian regions. K￿ll￿ and Vincze (1999) finally analyse the interaction
between self-employment and unemployment in Hungary and Romania. Their findings suggest that
higher flows into self-employment are registered in depressed regions, but that flows from self-
employment to employment were not higher in regions with high employment growth.
Table 11: Studies of active labour market policies
Authors Countries Measures Findings
Lubyova and van Ours
(1999)
Slovakia SPJ
PUJ
Training
Workers with better characteristics have a higher chance to enter
ALMP measures
Treatment effect is negative if selectivity is not accounted for, but
positive when this is taken into account
Exit rate to employment after ALMP measure increases by 150%
Mainly PUJ and training has a positive effect, SPJ have a
negative effect on the job finding rate
Van Ours (2000) Slovakia SPJ
PUJ
Training
Workers on temporary subsidised jobs have a higher job finding
rate than comparable other workers and retain the new-found
jobs for a longer time period
Long term subsidised jobs have a negative effect on the job
finding probability
Training has a positive effect on job finding rate
Lechner (1999) East Germany Vocational
training
programmes
No positive effects of training can be found in the first years after
training
Eichler and Lechner
(2000)
East Germany On the job
training
employment
programmes
Off the job
training
programmes
There are some positive effects of job training and employment
programmes but no effects of Off the job training
Kraus et al (1999) East Germany On the job and
off the job
training
Positive effects of both on the job and off the job training for
women, and positive effects of off the job training for men.
Kluve et al (2001) Poland Training
intervention works
Training enhances individual employment prospects
Intervention works participants fare worse than their comparison
group
Puhani (1998) Poland Training
intervention works
public works
Training improves the employment opportunities of both men
and women, intervention and public works do not: intervention
works prolong unemployment for both genders as do public
works for men
Puhani and Steiner
(1997)
Poland Public work
schemes
Public work schemes lead to a reduction in job finding
probabilities
Mickewright and Nagy
(1995)
Hungary Training course
participation
There is considerable evidence of ￿creaming￿ in selection
O￿ Leary (1997) Hungary
Poland
Strong evidence of non-random assignment to groups
Despite this, ALMP measures have positive effect on employment
Studies based on regional data
Terrel and Munich
(1995)
Czech Republic ALMP in total Regional outflow rates are increased by ALMP measures. The
elasticity of outflow rates with respect to ALMP Spending is 0.18
Source: own research.
Social benefits are a further potential influence on the search incentives of the unemployed. For
instance, Micklewright and Nagy (1999) note that in Hungary long-term unemployment is so
prevalent that exhaustion of unemployment benefits is the single most likely way to leave the
unemployment insurance system. On average the social benefits replace two thirds to three￿3 5￿
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quarters of the unemployment payments. Despite this substantial decrease in benefits, no increase
is found by Micklewright and Nagy (1999) in the escape probability from unemployment after
unemployment benefits expire. Furthermore, Micklewright and Nagy (1995b) find no difference in
employment probability between social welfare recipients and persons who do not receive social
welfare in Hungary.
Similarly to the literature on the effects of other non-employment benefits on the search incentives
of unemployed, evaluations of active labour market policies in candidate and transition economies
yield mixed and often discouraging results. For instance, Boeri (1997), in surveying the early
literature on labour market policy, concludes that the major lessons from this literature are that
￿First it is not wise to reduce the duration of unemployment benefits when the length of
unemployment spells is on the rise... [second] ... that it is possible to transform institutions and
create an efficient policy delivery mechanism within a short time span.￿ The most unanimous
finding in many of these contributions (see Table 11) is that substantial ￿creaming￿ occurred on the
part of labour market administrations. In general ALMP measures address the better qualified
among the unemployed in candidate countries. Other than this the available evidence seems to
slightly favour training programmes and in particular integration measures on short-term subsidised
jobs as more effective ALMP measures. Long-term subsidised jobs by contrast tend to be less
successful (see Table 11).
 	
-
A further assumption made in much of the original OST Literature was that existing state owned
firms could not restructure. It was thus expected from these models that firms in the ￿old sector￿
may not react to market incentives in a way similar to that in most mature market economies. The
socialist firm differed in many ways from firms in developed market economies. In particular, they
did not face the risk of bankruptcy even if losses were high (see: Svejnar, 1999) and were also
providing many social services, substituting for the role played by state agencies in market
economies. A substantial literature has developed on candidate countries, which is concerned with
the reaction of firms employment and wages to changes in output (see: Svejnar (1999) for a recent
survey).
The general findings of this literature (see: K￿r￿si, 1997, Estrin and Svenar, 1998, Commander
and Dhar, 1998) are that a) while the elasticity of employment with respect to sales was either
insignificant or low before the transition period it increased during transition b) the elasticity of
employment with respect to the own wages of the firms has increased in the transition period, c)
wages became more responsive to sales in the candidate countries. For instance Basu et al (1995)
in a comparative study of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland find that the elasticity
with respect to sales before transition ranged from 0.4 (Hungary) to 0.0 (Czech Republic) while
during the transition period it rose in all countries and ranged between 0,4 (Poland) and 0.7
(Hungary). The own wage elasticity was between ￿0.4 (Czech Republic) and ￿0.2 (Hungary) and￿3 6￿
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decreased in all countries but Slovakia to values between ￿0.6 (Czech Republic) and ￿1.0
(Hungary) while the elasticity of firms wages with respect to sales moved from virtually zero in all
countries to values between 0.004 to 0.3. K￿ll￿ (1997) found that the elasticity of employment
with .respect to. sales increased quite substantially in the early years of transition (0.35 in 1989-92
versus 0.19 in 1986-89). K￿ll￿ (2001) recently estimated demand models for large firms using
capital and heterogeneous labour (optimal share equations derived from the translog cost function
for four factors of production) and found own-wage elasticity of between -0.5 and -1.0 for skilled
and -1.5 for unskilled labour in 1996-99.
Table 12: Studies on Firm Behaviour in Transition
Authors Countries Elasticity Before Transition Elasticity after Transition
Elasticity of Labour demand with respect to output
Basu et al (1995) Poland
Hungary
Czech R.
Slovak R.
0.3
0.4 to 0.6
0.0
0.1
0.4
0.7 to 0.8
0.5 to 0.6
0.3
Basu et al (1997) Poland 0.2
Grosfeld ad Nivet (1997) Poland 0.06 0.25
K￿ll￿ (1997) Hungary 0.2 0.2
K￿r￿si (1997) Hungary 0.5 to 0.6 0.5 to 0.8
Singer (1996) Czech R 0.0 to 0.1
Elasticity of Labour demand with respect to wages
Basu et al (1995) Poland
Hungary
Czech R.
Slovak R.
- 0.3
- 0.2
- 0.4
- 0.3
-0.8
- 1.0 to - 2.3
- 0.6 to ￿ 1.0
- 0.3
Basu et al (1997) Poland - 0.3
Grosfeld ad Nivet (1997) Poland - 0.03 - 0.13
K￿ll￿ (1997) Hungary - 0.6 - 0.3
K￿r￿si (1997) Hungary -0.1 to -0.8 -0.4 to ￿1.4
Singer (1996) Czech R -0.0 to ￿0.1
Elasticity of Labour demand with respect to sales
Basu et al (1995) Poland
Hungary
Czech R.
Slovak R.
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.3 to 0.4
0.3 to 0.4
0.3 to 0.4
0.3 to 0.4
Basu et al (1997) Poland 0.3
Source: Svenar (1999)
Thus the evidence suggests that firm behaviour quickly adopted to the new situation after transition.
In reviewing the literature and comparing the results to studies on mature market economies
Svenar (1999) concludes that "firms in all CEE economies started adjusting employment to output
changes and the estimated elasticities rapidly rose to levels that are by and large comparable to
those estimated in western economies".
This finding may be calibrated farther, taking into account that certain types of firms react
differently to market conditions. Since restructuring incentives may be influenced by both the￿3 7￿
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market situation of firms and ownership, a number of researchers have differentiated either
between firms with growing or falling sales (K￿ll￿, 1997, Estrin and Svejnar (1998) or firms of
different ownership types (Basu et al, 1997, Grosfed and Nivet, 1997). The results of this research
seem to suggest that:
Both firms with increasing as well as decreasing sales started to adjust employment during
transition, but firms with falling sales started adjustment already before transition. For instance
Estrin and Svenar (1998) in a comparative study of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia find that in all countries but Hungary labour demand elasticities of firms with falling and
rising sales were comparable during transition, but that estimated elasticities were substantially
lower for firms with rising sales before transition (see: also Svejnar, 1999).
The studies discussed above provide evidence that ownership type and legal form have ambiguous
effects on labour demand elasticities. Basu et al (1995) report that there is no systematic effect of
ownership variables on employment. Basu et al (1997) suggests that private firms employ fewer
workers ceteris paribus. In contrast, Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) find that privatised firms increase
employment more than state owned and non-commercialised firms.
Ambiguous evidence related to ownership cross section may be caused by the fact that all the
above studies are based on data from the early transition period. Employment changes were net
effects of two different adjustment processes, in operation at the same time: (i) policy to shed
labour to eliminate initial labour hoarding, (ii) increased demand for labour following possible
increase in sales accompanied by increased labour productivity. Indeed, more recent results
suggest that in the later stage of transition the difference between ownership sectors may be more
pronounced. In particular, Konings et al. (2002) using an extensive data set of 9,500 companies in
both manufacturing and services find that for period 1997-2000 in Ukraine, new private firms
strongly outperform all other categories in terms of employment creation.
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A further criticism voiced concerning the OST literature is that it downplayed the role of individual
wage flexibility as an adjustment process in accession candidate countries (see Boeri and Terrel,
2002). Transition in the candidate countries, however, has been associated with a remarkable
differentiation of individual incomes. Newell (2001) for Poland, Kertesi and K￿ll￿ (2000) for
Hungary and Romania as well as Abraham and Kezdi (2000) for Hungary and UNICEF (1999) for
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia have found that both wage and
income inequality have increased during the transition period.
12 In a comparative study of the
12 This finding has, however, not gone undisputed. Keane and Prasad (2002) find that while wage inequality increased
throughout 1990￿1997, income inequality increased much less dramatically, due to well designed transfer policies.￿3 8￿
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earnings distribution for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria,
Romania and Croatia, Rutkowski (1996) finds that:
• "In all cases, except Slovenia the earnings distribution has become more flat topped indicating
that workers are less centred around the mode,
• In the majority of cases the proportion of workers falling into the range of low wages has
increased,
• In all cases the distribution has become markedly more stretched out to the right, indicating the
emergence and increased incidence of (relatively) high wages."
Table 13: Studies of individual wages in candidate countries
Authors Countries Time period Results
Chase (1994) Czech R
Slovak R.
1984 and
1993
Return to one year of education increased for males from around
0.02 to 0.05 and females from 0.04 to 0.05
Rutkowski (1996) Poland 1984 and
1992
Return to education increased from 0.05 to 0.07 or 0.08
Krueger and Pischke (1992) East
Germany
1988 and
1991
Return to education decreased in early German transition from
0.077 to 0.062
Bird et al.(1994) East
Germany
1989 to 1991 Return to education remained almost constant in early transition
Munich et al. (2000) Czech R. 1989 and
1996
Transition brought increasing returns to education, by 1996
returns were comparable to Western Europe
Wage experience profiles did not change
Inter-industry wage structure remained stable
Newell (2001) Poland 1992 and
1997
Aggregate wage inequality did not increase in Poland
Puhanyi and Steiner (1996) East
Germany
1990 and
1994
Returns to experience for men were reduced to zero in transition,
for women it did not change
Returns to education for men increased slightly
Firm size wage effects became more important
Hunt (2002) East
Germany
1990 and
1994
Male/female wage differential declined by 10 percentage points
Kertesi and K￿ll￿ (1999) Hungary 1986￿1996 Returns to education increased until 1992 and then declined until
1995
Wages rose faster for younger workers
Orazem and Vodopivec
(2000)
Slovenia
Estonia
Male/female wage differentials declined in transition in both
countries
Kertesi and K￿ll￿ (2001) Hungary 1986 to 1999 Returns to education increased until 1992 and then declined until
1995
Wages rose faster for younger workers
Kroncke and Smith (1999) Estonia 1990￿1995 Wage differentails between native Russians and Estonians cannot
be explained by differences in characteristics
Source: Svejnar (1999), own research.
The increase in income inequality according to Rutkowski is thus due to a combination of
increased incidence of both low and high incomes at the expense of a reduction of middle income
earners. In part the increase in income inequality has been caused by reduced employment, higher
unemployment and reduced participation in particular through early retirement (see Newell, 2001,
and Milanovic, 2001). Furthermore, as pointed out by Milanovic (1999), the increase in inequality￿3 9￿
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seems to be closely associated with the process of privatisation as leavers from the middle income
groups in the state sector either ended in high wage earning jobs or low income unemployment.
This is also supported by microeconomic evidence. K￿ll￿ and Nagy (1996) find that in particular
older industrial workers, who spent their life working in state-owned enterprises and fell into
unemployment, may lose 18 to 25% when re-employed, while younger workers with the same
labour market history, secondary education and little work experience may experience real wage
gains of 10 to 15%.
In contrast to increased income inequality, a major driving force for increased wage inequality
were higher returns to education. The communist wage grid maintained extremely low rates of
return on education (see Munich et al., 2000). After transition, however, the vocational education
system in many candidate countries, which generally put too much emphasis on relatively narrow
skills (see Boeri, 2001), caused a substantial skill shortage, which in turn led to rapidly rising rates
of return on education (see Munich et al., 2000; Kertesi and K￿ll￿, 1999; Abraham and Kezdi,
2000; Puhanyi and Steiner, 1996). Again Rutkowski (1996) finds that wage differentials by
educational attainment in all six transition economies analysed increased from very low levels at
the beginning of transition to levels close to those observed in developed market economies by
1993. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that the value of experience ￿ pre-transition ￿
declined while wages for young (and educated) workers rose rapidly (see Kertesi and K￿ll￿, 1999;
Steiner and Puhanyi, 1998). This may reflect the substantial technological changes in candidate
countries which devalued pre-transition labour market experience.
Gender wage differences, by contrast, decreased slightly during the first decade of transition
(Orazem and Vodopivec, 2000). Hunt (2002), however, argues that the ten point decline in
gender wage differentials in East Germany may not necessarily be good news for German women.
According to her analysis, almost half of this decline can be explained by involuntary exit of low-
qualified women from employment (mostly to unemployment).
Finally, some evidence collected suggests wage discrimination has emerged, directed against
Russian minorities in the Baltics (see Chase, 2000; Kroncke and Smith, 1999) and against gypsies
in the CEECs. Kroncke and Smith (1999) for instance, using the 1994 labour force survey, find
evidence of wage discrimination against the Russian minority in Estonia. In particular they find that
this discrimination applies to Estonian-born ethnic Russians rather than recent migrants, and that
Estonian language skills do not diminish wage discrimination.
Transition has, however, also resulted in a substantial wage differentiation among observably
similar individuals. For instance, Abraham and Kezdi (2000) conclude that ￿the most important
factors (for increased wage inequality) are not captured by simple demographic variables. Within
groups, variation accounted for more than three fourths of total variation by 1996￿. In part this
may be explained by increasing returns to certain employer characteristics. Steiner and Puhanyi
(1998) for instance present evidence that firm size wage effects have increased in East Germany,￿4 0￿
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and Newell (2000) as well as Milanovic (2001) present some evidence to support increased inter-
industry wage differentials.
Individual level wages have thus been highly flexible in the candidate countries. Emerging
disparities on the one hand reflect relative scarcities of factors and individual differences in
productivity. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that this differentiation of wages is closely
associated with progress in transition. Sibley and Walsh (2002) for instance find that wage
inequality is higher in regions which have progressed further in transition.
Most studies that have attempted to empirically analyse wage determination in regional labour
markets focus on the elasticity of regional wages with respect to some measure of regional labour
demand such as the unemployment rate. Within this framework there are two competing
approaches. One class of papers follows the wage curve approach (see Blanchflower and Oswald,
1994) where the cross-sectional variance in variables is used to assess the impact of wages, and
second models use the longitudinal variance in data (i.e. the notion of Phillips Curves) (see
Baddeley et al., 2000).
Most of the evidence concerning the reaction of wages to regional unemployment rates in
candidate countries has been based on the wage curve approach and results have been mixed.
Boeri and Scarpetta (1996) find correctly (negatively) signed but insignificant parameters when
estimating equations that relate regional wage change to changes or levels of unemployment
rates, and Commader and McHale (1995) report ambiguous results for the Visegrad countries. By
contrast, Kertesi and K￿ll￿ (1995), using smaller regional units, and Kertesi and K￿ll￿ (1997),
using individual data for Hungary, find a significant negative impact of unemployment levels on
regional wages and present evidence that the elasticity has increased in the course of transition.
Kallai and Traistaru (2001) report a significant impact of unemployment rates on wages in a wide
variety of specifications for Romania, while Duffy and Walsh (2001) find robust elasticities of wage
levels with respect to unemployment rates using both Polish regional as well as individual data
from 1991 to 1996 of around ￿0.1.
These ambiguous results of ￿wage curve￿ estimates are, however, not in contrast to results for the
European Union member states. For instance, Guichard and Laffargue (2000) find substantial
heterogeneity in wage curve estimates across 15 EU States and the US and conclude that this
variance cannot easily be explained by differences in institutions or development between the
countries. Similarly, Abraham (1996), regressing wage growth equations on regional and national
unemployment rates, finds that regional unemployment rates have a significant influence on
regional wage growth only in high unemployment regions, and Winter-Ebmer (1996), in a recent
literature survey, finds that wage curve estimates have not been very robust.￿4 1￿
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Table 14: Studies on regional response of wages to unemployment rates
Countries Dependent variable Elasticity with respect to unemployment rate
Kallai and Traistaru (1999) Romania Wage level 0.13 to ￿0.25
Duffy and Walsh (2001) Poland Wage level 0.16 to ￿0.11
Huber (2002) Czech R
Slovak R.
Poland
Hungary
Wage change Elasticity with respect to unemployment rates is slightly
higher in candidate countries than in the EU, the elasticity
with respect to national unemployment rates is lower in
candidate countries
Kertesi and K￿ll￿ (1997) Hungary Wage levels Unemployment rate has significant negative impact on
wage level
Kertesi and K￿ll￿ (1995) Hungary Wage levels (ind. data) Unemployment rate has significant negative impact on
wage level
Boeri and Scarpetta (1996) Czech R.
Hungary
Poland
Slovak R.
Wage change Coefficients of change in unemployment are insignificant
Commander and Hale
(1995)
Vysegrad
Countries
Wage level There is substantial heterogeniety among countries,
results are ambiguous
Source: Burda, Boeri, K￿ll￿ (1998), own research.
In part these non-robust results may be due to the conceptual differences between ￿wage curve￿
and ￿Phillips curve￿. The first is usually interpreted as an equilibrium concept, the second as an
adjustment process. As recently pointed out by Card (1995), a specification that nests both the
wage curve as well as Phillips curve approaches would be:
(1) t ij t ij t ij t j t ij u u w , 1 , 2 , 1 , , V f f h + + + = D -
where wijt is the wage rate of region i in country j at time t; hj,t is a country and time specific fixed
effect intended to control for country and time specific shocks such as productivity shocks; and uij,t
is the unemployment rate in region i of country j at time t. If in this specification f2=0, a dynamic
Phillips curve relationship emerges. In this formulation wage changes depend on the level of
unemployment rates. By contrast the wage curve as a long run equilibrium relationship requires
f1=-f2 since in this case wage differences are a function of changes in unemployment rates. Using
this approach, B￿ttner (1999) attempts to distinguish between the ￿Phillips curve￿ and ￿wage
curve￿ concept and finds that the relationship between wage growth and unemployment is more
closely related to a regional adjustment mechanism than an equilibrium relationship. Keteresi and
K￿ll￿ (2000), using similar methods, find substantial instability in the parameter estimates of the
wage curve estimates in Hungary. In particular the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to
unemployment rates increased in the years from 1989 to 1993, reaching levels comparable to
Western Europe in 1993, and then increased further until 1996. In Huber (2002), we estimate
variants of equation (1) in which we allow wage changes to depend on both national as well as
regional unemployment rates for candidate countries as well as member state. Our results suggest
that the elasticity with respect to regional unemployment rates is slightly higher in candidate
countries than in the EU, the elasticity with respect to national unemployment rates is lower.￿4 2￿
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Recently, some authors have used time series methods to identify the connection between wages,
unemployment and prices. This evidence too seems to suggest some wage flexibility in the
candidate countries. For instance, Welfe et al. (2002) find that in Poland the price elasticity of
wages is unity ￿ as predicted by standard economic theory ￿, while Golinelli and Orsi (1998) find
a stable long-term relationship between prices and wages in both Hungary and Poland.
Damijan and Kostevc (2002a) investigate the impact of economic integration with the European
Union on regional relative wages and find that there is a tendency of income polarisation in
Estonia and Romania while declining regional relative wages are found in Bulgaria and Hungary.
In Slovenia both catching up and polarisation tendencies are found.
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Economic theory (Todaro, 1969) predicts that migration is related to the expected income
differential, i.e. the wage differential adjusted for the probability of finding employment, between
the regions of origin and destination. Labour mobility is thus an important channel for mitigating
the effects of region-specific asymmetric shocks. Unemployed workers migrate from regions hit by
adverse shocks to regions with more favourable conditions. Similarly, high wages attract inflows of
workers from regions with lower wages. This pattern of adjustment helps equilibrate the effects of
asymmetric shocks. In a hypothetical economy with perfect factor mobility, regions would adjust to
asymmetric shocks immediately. When labour mobility is low and prices and wages rigid, the
effects of asymmetric shocks persist and regional economies have to rely on other mechanisms,
such as fiscal transfers, to absorb them.
Lack of labour mobility can have profound economic and political consequences. It is thus often
argued that the viability of currency unions, and of EMU in particular, is threatened by low labour
mobility within and across member countries (see Eichengreen, 1998). Fidrmuc et al. (1999) argue
that low labour mobility in former Czechoslovakia contributed to economic tensions that eventually
led to the break-up of the country.
Despite this importance and in contrast to most other indicators, migration in transition economies
has been little researched. The limited evidence available suggests low regional mobility in most
CEE countries. Although Burda and Profit (1996) find indirect evidence of some mobility, by
analysing spatial correlation in matching function estimates, Fidrmuc￿s (2001) analysis of regional
migration data for both the candidate countries and member states finds lower mobility in the
candidate countries than in the EU. This mismatch has remained high throughout the transition
period. This pertains in particular to regional mismatch (see Scarpetta and Boeri, 1996) and can
be explained by the high costs of transport, which impinge on the possibility of commuting.
Fazekas, Kertesi and K￿ll￿ (1993) for instance present evidence that in Hungary an average
commuting distance of 15 km will cause costs equivalent to the minimum wage and that
transportation costs for distances in excess of 50 kilometres could equal an average salary.￿4 3￿
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Clearly, this suggests that the extent of commuting as an labour market ￿adjustment mechanism￿ is
limited.
Table 15: Migration rates, wage and unemployment rate disparities in selected candidate and
member states
Country Year Average
population
Gross migration
rate
Net migration
rate
Coefficient of variation of
unemployment rate
Coefficient of
variation of wages
Netherlands 1992 1260.6 1.64 0.19 0.170 0.024
1995 1308.9 1.62 0.18 0.134 0.023
Italy 1983 2828.8 0.64 0.10 0.295 0.090
1995 2863.4 0.28 0.16 0.561 0.088
Spain 1983 2003.5 0.66 0.16 0.225 0.152
1994 2059.0 0.52 0.14 0-222 0.084
Poland 1992 783.0 0.72 0.06 0.292 0.086
1998 789.1 0.44 0.05 0.342 0.113
Slovenia 1996 165,9 0.14 0.02 0,079
1998 165,2 0.15 0.02 0.290 0.082
Slovakia 1992 0.43 0.248 0.076
1995 0.31 0.293 0.117
Czech Republic
Okresy (76
regions)
1992 137,5 1.08 0.11 0.483 0.078
1998 137,3 0.87 0.19 0.389 0.097
NUTS II (New
Kraje 14)
1992 736,8 0.68 0.12 0.398 0.102
1998 735,4 0.56 0.14 0.352 0.145
Old Kraje (8) 1992 1.289,4 0.56 0.02 0.402 0.073
1998 1.286,9 0.47 0.01 0.398 0,146
Source: Regio database (EU data), Regional Statistical yearbooks (Candidate county data), own calculations
In Table 15 we report the percentage of population which changed their region of residence in
1993 in the CEECs and in selected EU member states. We find that in 1993 migration rates were
clearly below those of the Netherlands and Spain. Furthermore, internal migration rates have been
falling since 1993 in the candidate countries. In both the Czech Republic as well as in Poland
internal migration rates were at a level of around 80% in 1998 relative to their 1993 values. This
fall in internal mobility contrasts sharply with the increasing regional inequalities in both terms of
wages as well as unemployment. In Poland both the dispersion of regional unemployment rates
and of wage levels as measured by the coefficient of variation increased over the period from
1992 to 1998 while migration declined. The Czech Republic experienced a reduction in the
dispersion of unemployment rates, but wage levels also diverged substantially.
Similarly low and in many cases declining levels of migration have been found by some authors for
internal migration in the EU (see Faini et al., 1997 for Italy; Fatas, 2000 for Germany, the UK,
Norway and France). Given this finding, it is to be expected that regional mobility is even less of a
viable adjustment mechanism for candidate countries than for the existing member states, since
migration is low in the member states and still lower in candidate countries. In a recent￿4 4￿

comparative paper, Puhanyi (1999) finds that internal migration is highest in Germany, but that
even there it may take several years to accommodate to an unemployment shock.
There are, however, a number of arguments other than lack of labour market flexibility which can
explain decreasing migration: First, wage disparities could have been countervailed by decreasing
unemployment rate disparities. Second, one could argue that spatial matching has become less
efficient over time. Third, other income components such as family and government support, black
market income or income from subsistence farming may have countervailed wage divergence, and
fourth, inefficiencies in housing markets could have led to decreasing migration. Finally, in the
context of transition economies it could be argued that in the early years of systemic
transformation, wage and unemployment disparities did not fully reflect long-term economic
prospects of regions, but were influenced by past experience. For instance, in the early 1990s the
heavy industry and mining regions still belonged to high wage regions of the country and suffered
unemployment rates only slightly above average, although these regions were generally considered
to be the ones with bad economic prospects (see Gorzelak, 1996). To the extent that inhabitants
had rational expectations concerning the extent of this upcoming decline, maximising future
expected income may have involved moving despite low wage disparities between sending and
receiving regions. More generally, one can argue that the early years of transition were associated
with substantial uncertainty and restructuring. This in itself may have contributed to inflating
migration and can potentially explain the stylised fact of increased bilateral migration.
Some of the research on migration in candidate countries gives support to some of these
hypotheses. For instance, Totev (2000) finds that rural to urban migration in Bulgaria reversed in
the period from 1989 to 1995. In 1995 more people moved from the towns to the country than in
the opposite direction. This suggests that in the unfavourable economic situation of Bulgaria
alternative income from subsistence farming may have been important for the determination of
migration flows. Mayo and Stein (1995) in a study which focuses on the pretransition period,
estimate an equation in which, aside from wages, the housing units per 100 households in 1981
are used to explain internal migration of 1985. They find this variable to be highly correlated with
migration rates. Also Kallai and Traisatru (1999) find that housing availability has a strong positive
impact on immigration rates in post-reform Romania. In Fidrmuc and Huber (2001), we find that
declines in migration rates were primarily due to declines in long-distance migration and declines
in bilateral migration. Furthermore, we find that migration has become increasingly responsive to
regional wage differentials, while unemployment differences seem to have become less important.
This suggests that inefficiencies in housing markets and settlement structures (suburbanisation) have
been more important in explaining declining migration than labour market inefficiencies.
Low internal migration in the candidate countries could to some degree be mitigated by higher
international migration. In the context of enlargement of the European Union concern has been
expressed that enlargement could result in substantial international migration from candidate to
current member countries. Lubyova (2002) analyses the international behaviour of a set of￿4 5￿
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European countries (candidate countries, member states and members of the European Economic
Area). She finds that international migration in candidate countries is substantially less responsive
to wage differences than international migration in the EU but much more responsive to
unemployment rate differentials. Thus international migration in the candidate countries seems to
be less efficient in mitigating regional disparities than migration within the EU.
! "
The flexibility of labour markets in candidate countries is of interest in the context of accession to
the European Union, since in the absence of precise estimates of the size of shocks, labour market
flexibility can be an insurance to adverse asymmetric shocks. One way to learn about the capability
of candidate countries￿ labour markets to absorb asymmetric shocks is to focus on adjustment
within these countries. In this chapter the literature on ￿stylised facts￿ of labour market dynamics in
candidate countries is summarised. The major findings can be summarised as follows:
1. Candidate countries￿ labour markets have been characterised by a low turnover in and out of
unemployment despite substantial structural change. In particular flows out of unemployment
have remained small and most of the change in the sector composition of the work force
seems to have been accomplished by job to job mobility paired with early retirements and new
workers.
2. Migration rates have experienced declines during transition, despite rising regional disparities
but evidence concerning differences in the reaction of migration to wage and unemployment
rate disparities remains inconclusive.
3. The elasticity of real wage growth in candidate countries with respect to regional
unemployment rates is as ambiguous as in the EU and individual wages have shown
substantial flexibility. This resulted in increased income inequality.
4. Same as in the EU countries, there is substantial heterogeneity in labour market dynamics
among candidate countries.
While these results do not challenge the desirability of enlargement since it will have positive effects
on employment and GDP growth in candidate countries and existing member states, they highlight
the role of policy in securing these benefits. In particular if accession leads to further industrial
restructuring, with some industries profiting and others suffering, this will lead to an increased
demand for mobility among workers. The low mobility rates in candidate countries suggest
prioritising policies designed to enable the workforce to meet this demand, by education policy,
focusing active labour market policies on training, improving the effectiveness of active labour
market policy and using structural funds for active (rather than passive) restructuring measures in
the regions. Evidence suggests that wage flexibility and institutional barriers to mobility by contrast
are comparable to the EU.￿4 6￿
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On the side of the European Union our findings suggest that the special situation of candidate
countries should be taken into account in negotiating accession. In particular care must be taken
that accession does not impede on the capability of candidate countries to cope with asymmetric
shocks on the labour market as has been recently warned by Burda (1998) in the context of the
adoption of the social acquis and that access to substantial regional transfers in the framework of
the cohesion funds is used mainly to finance investments in low income regions.￿4 7￿
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Aside from aggregate and individual data analysis summarised in the last section, indications of
the effects of integration on candidate countries￿ labour markets can be found in regional analysis.
Moving to this ￿meso-level￿ can be interesting for a number of reasons:
1. In a macroeconomic sense the economy as a whole is subject to repeated shocks to aggregate
labour demand and supply (see last chapter). Regional analysis can provide valuable insights
into the adjustment of integrated labour markets for a number of reasons. First, as recently
argued by Obstfeld and Peri (2000), regions in a country are more highly integrated than
countries in the European Union, thus extrapolating from regions provides a chance to gauge
the effect of integration in a given national institutional framework. Thus the substantial body of
research on intra-national labour market adjustment (e.g. Decressin and Fatas, 1995; Fatas,
2000; B￿ttner, 2000) can be used to assess the effects of integration. Second, one way to
overcome the lack of time series data in candidate countries is to use intra-national regional
data to analyse labour market adjustment mechanisms.
2. A new body of literature has recently suggested that integration, regional development and
shock asymmetry may not be independent of each other. In the so-called ￿geography and
trade￿ models (see Krugmann, 1991) integration of economies through reducing transport
costs changes the distribution of economic activity in a country. This may either lead to
situations where regions become increasingly specialised on only a few sectors, or it may
increase the regional concentration of economic activity (i.e. all activity becomes more
concentrated in a few localities). While the later effect (so-called urbanisation effects) has direct
implications on the changes for regional convergence, the first effect (so-called agglomeration
effects) may account for business cycles becoming more asymmetric as integration proceeds,
this in turn may increase the challenges of enlargement for candidate countries by causing
both economic divergence as well as increasingly asymmetric shocks (see Martin, 2001).
Studying the development of candidate countries￿ regions is thus of major importance in assessing
the potential labour market implications of accession, since one can learn about national
adjustment mechanisms as well as the potential endogeneity of convergence and business cycles to
the integration process. In this chapter we focus on results concerning three aspects of regional
development which will be of particular importance in our future work. First, we concentrate on
regional convergence and divergence as well as the determinants of regional growth in the
candidate countries. Second, we look at the changes in economic structure, which have occurred
since the beginning of economic reforms and third, we present the limited evidence on regional
labour market flexibility.￿4 8￿
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Regional developments in candidate countries, however, can only be understood in the context of
the legacies of the former socialist system. Regional policy in the socialist era put more emphasis
on the goal of regional equalisation than is the case in most market economies. The policy of
￿socialist industrialisation￿ of peripheral regions, however, was associated both with functional
disparities and mono-industrialisation (see Smith, 1998). These two phenomena were closely
linked to the inefficiencies of production in many candidate countries. In planned economies,
incomes and career opportunities of managers were related to plan fulfilment. Managers were thus
less concerned about profit and much more risk-averse than their counterparts in market
economies. This led to a strategy oriented to avoiding standstills of production by means of
hoarding both labour and inventory (see Kornai, 1994). Furthermore, the attempt to avoid
production standstills coupled with the firm belief of Marxist economic theory in increasing returns
to scale led to substantially larger firms. Managers attempted to obtain control over the complete
value chain, while political decision makers hoped to increase production efficiency through
increasing returns of scale.
In terms of regional development these distortions had implications for the location of production.
Spatial planners in particular were more concerned about bringing work to the workers than in
most market economies. New production locations were developed mostly as a site for a plant of
much larger firms. In consequence newly established plants in peripheral regions tended to serve
production purposes only. Many did not have research and development, design or even ￿sales￿
functions (Smith, 1998). This in consequence led to substantial functional disparities. Dostal and
Hampl (1994) for instance document that 51% of all Czech firms had their central office in Prague
in the 1960s, and in the 1980s almost 60% of the R&D departments resided in Prague.
In most mature market economies such functional disparities would have resulted in disparities in
economic activity. In the planned economies they remained latent. In general the outcome of
regional planning resulted in a more even dispersion of economic activity than in most market
economies (see Huber and Palme, 2001). In particular industrial employment was much more
evenly distributed across regions than in most Western European market economies and wage
disparities across regions were smaller. Thus in the Czech Republic the average wage level of the
region with the highest regional income was 1.3-fold that of the region with the lowest regional
wage level. In Slovakia this ratio lay at 1.2. whereas in most EU countries it was substantially
higher.
But even socialist spatial planners could not completely disregard the goal of economic efficiency.
Bachtler (1992) for instance argues that the preferences given to eastern regions in industrial
development in many countries of the former socialist block was a result of the necessity to secure
low transport costs for primary inputs from Russia. In consequence, the regional planning process
was influenced by numerous contradictory goals, same as in market economies. Furthermore, the￿4 9￿
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concrete weight attached to different goals changed over time and countries (Hamilton, 1973). In
former Czechoslovakia, for instance, the first five year plan explicitly stated the goal of socialist
industrialisation of Slovakia; in Poland and the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), on the
other hand, little more than general clauses existed in legal texts to guide regional planners.
Socialist industrialisation also implied a tendency to set up mono-industrialised, or mono enterprise
regions (see Huber and Ochotnicky, 1995). During transition this mono-industrialisation was of
some relevance not only because it increased the risk a region faced on the labour market but also
because enterprises in socialist systems took over functions usually provided by state agencies in
market economies (such as kindergardens, housing, etc.). Thus, if in a mono-enterprise region the
large firm was under financial stress, these social functions would not be provided (Smith, 1998).
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Given the substantial functional disparities at the time of reforms it should come as no surprise that
the literature on regional development has repeatedly stressed the emergence of regional
disparities in candidate countries (see Boeri and Scarpetta, 1996; Petrakos, 1999; Huber and
Palme, 2001; R￿misch, 2002) and has established a number of lines along which disparities
develop. As suggested by theoretical considerations, substantial evidence points to regional
divergence rather than convergence in most candidate countries. In Huber and Palme (2001) we
find clear evidence of both beta and sigma divergence in the wage levels in Poland, Hungary and
Slovakia. Furthermore unemployment rates diverged in Poland and Hungary. Similar results were
obtained by Petrakos (1995) using a slightly different time period for Romania, Poland, Bulgaria
and Hungary. Finally R￿misch (2002), looking at the development of the complete distribution of
GDP levels in the candidate countries, finds signs of divergence and polarisation, while Profit
(1999), focusing on unemployment rates, presents similar evidence for the Czech Republic
13.
These tendencies of divergence also seem to apply to the larger set of candidate countries
considered in this research project and seems to be present ￿ if to a lesser degree ￿ also in the
current member states of the European Union. Although empirical evidence concerning GDP per
capita convergence in the European Union is mixed, with results varying according to the time
period (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996) and regional disaggregation (see Br￿ndle, 1994), a
divergence of regional unemployment rates is found by a number of studies (see Padoa and
Kostoris, 1999; and Marelli, 1999). Overman and Puga (1999) also find that European regions
have experienced an increasing polarisation in the regional distribution of unemployment rates.
Regions which had intermediate unemployment rates in 1986 very often found themselves in the
13 These results are also consistent with national tendencies of countries. Boone and Maurel (1998) as well as Konecna
(1999) find only weak convergence tendencies among candidate countries both pre transition as well as during
transition. Sarajevs (2001) however, finds using a range of methods (simple graphics, non-parametric tests, cross section
regressions and dynamic panel estimations) that there is some evidence of alpha and beta convergence.￿5 0￿
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upper or lower tails of the unemployment rate distribution in 1996, moves to the middle by
contrast were rare.
Assessments on the size of regional disparities relative to member states depend on whether
absolute measures (such as the standard deviation) or relative measures (such as variation
coefficients) are used. Focusing on absolute measures, the Second Cohesion Report (EC, 2001)
reports that regional disparities in the Czech Republic (where regional GDP levels differ most
strongly among regions) are smaller than in the United Kingdom, Italy or Austria, and range in the
middle of other EU member states. The absolute dispersion in regional unemployment rates by
contrast seems to have reached levels comparable to middle range EU countries in more
advanced candidate countries. The picture conveyed by the cohesion report changes, however,
when relative measures of dispersion are considered. Since average GDP levels are substantially
lower in candidate countries than in the more developed member states, dividing any measure of
dispersion by average GDP leads to higher relative GDP disparities than for instance in Italy (see
Huber and Palme, 2001)
Table 16: Estimation results concerning ￿long run persistence￿ of unemployment rates in the
regions of the candidate countries and EU (Coeffcients of Correlation)
Unemployment
rate
Participation
rate
Wages Unemployment
rate
Participation
rate
Wages
1992￿1998 1992 ￿1995 1992 ￿1995 1992 ￿1998 1992 ￿1995 1992 ￿1995
Poland 0.90 0.85 0.95 Germany 0.99 0.99 0.99
Czech Republic 0.65 - 0.84 Italy 0.96 0.98 0.99
Slovakia (1996) 0.80 0.68 0.93 Netherlands 0.72 0.99 0.96
Slovenia - - 0.92 Portugal
(1997)
0.78 0.88 0.88
Hungary 0.90 0.86 0.91 Spain 0.78 0.82 0.86
Source: own calculation
Furthermore, the distribution of regional GDP, wage and unemployment rate levels has been
relatively stable throughout transition. Regions showing better performance at the outset of
transition have also tended to perform better in later phases, which suggests that a substantial part
of the comparative advantages of regional development was determined prior to transition, and
intra-distribution mobility has been low. This is evidenced in a number of contributions (see, e.g.,
Profit, 1999; Huber and W￿rg￿tter, 1999) and in Table 16, where we report correlation
coefficients of unemployment rates, participation rates and wages in 1990 with the levels
prevailing in 1998. These correlation results are highly significant at conventional levels. There is,
however, also substantial variance among countries. For instance, the lowest correlation
coefficients in unemployment rate levels are reached in the Czech Republic (0.65), and the
strongest correlation is found in Poland and Hungary (0,90). For participation rates, the correlation
coefficients range between 0.68 for Slovakia and 0.86 for Hungary. In general, countries with￿5 1￿
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smaller regions (Slovakia and Czech Republic) tend to have the lowest correlation coefficients,
while Poland and Hungary exhibit higher correlations in particular concerning unemployment rates.
Interpreting these correlations as a measure of change of position within the distribution, the
significance should not come as a surprise. Similar developments can be documented and similar
stable distributions for Western Europe and the United States. Indeed when comparing the
correlation coefficients to current EU member states they are lower in the CEECs than in the EU,
which suggests higher intra- distribution change in the CEECs than in Western Europe.
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Given the evidence of both divergence in candidate countries and slightly higher intra-distribution
churning in the candidate countries than in current member states, it is important to determine
what has caused the regional differentiation and polarisation. In analogy to the literature on
national development during transition and mirroring theoretical expectations, research into the
determinants of successful or less successful regional development has focused on three potential
candidates for differentiation of regional ￿fortunes￿ in transition.
First, starting conditions ￿ in particular sectoral specialisation, urbanisation and mono-
industrialisation ￿ have been repeatedly named as determinants of regional welfare. Second, the
effects of integration into the western international division of labour have been looked at and,
finally, reform policies (in particular privatisation and new enterprise creation) have been
emphasised as potential sources of regional differentiation. Numerous studies (see, e.g., Barjak
and Humpold, 1999; Gorzelak, 1996, for Poland; Smith, 1998, and Bucek, 1999, for Slovakia;
Totev, 2000, for Bulgaria; Scarpetta and Huber, 1995; as well as EPRC, 2001, for the CEE 10)
have attempted to isolate different factors important for regional development. In general these
studies point to a set of stylised facts which give some role to each of these developments.

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An analysis of regional development within transition economies points at an important role played
by inherited structures for economic development. In general, three lines of differentiation have
been of particular importance. First, urbanisation is one of the most important determinants of
regional success in candidate countries. In particular large cities and capital cities have profited
from transition.
Second, some mono-industrial regions have faced considerable labour market problems in the last
decade. As already stated, the socialist system of regional planning tended towards higher regional
specialisation of individual regions. In much of the literature on regional development in the
candidate countries, a high specialisation of regions thus has been considered a vice rather than a
virtue, since many of the industries residing in these specialised regions were expected to decline in
future. This is in line with much of the literature on the effects of specialisation on labour markets in￿5 2￿
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mature market economies (e.g. Curtis, 1992; Topel and Neumann, 1991). This literature (in
particular Topel and Neumann, 1991) has pointed out that the disadvantages of specialisation
revolve around risk. Specialised regions are particularly susceptible to industry-specific shocks and
characterised by a human capital structure that is heavily geared towards the needs of the
dominant industry. Heavily specialised regions may therefore be characterised by higher frictional
unemployment and a greater risk of asymmetric shocks than less specialised regions. These
asymmetries will, however, only result in labour market problems if the respective dominant industry
is in decline, while specialisation in growing industries may actually alleviate labour market
problems.
More recent literature on regional development, however, has stressed the virtues of specialisation
more strongly. The models of the ￿new economic geography￿ (Krugmann, 1991) stress localised
within- and cross-industry external effects as important for regional growth. If such externalities are
important, increased specialisation will be a natural consequence of regional development. This
tendency towards concentration is, however, countered by disagglomerative forces such as
transport costs and negative externalities caused by increased ￿congestion￿ within a region. The
optimum amount of specialisation thus depends on transport costs and the extent of positive and
negative externalities arising from spatial agglomeration. Thus from a theoretical point of view
increased specialisation has an ambiguous effect on labour market development.
Studies which have focused on the link between mono-industrialisation and labour market
performance of a region also tend to be irrelevant in this respect. In Huber and Ochotnicky (1995)
we find substantial heterogeneity in the development of mono-enterprise regions in the early stages
of transition, where mono-industrialisation in particular is uncorrelated with vacancy levels and
unemployment rates. Similarly, Herzog (2000) finds that greater specialisation was positively
correlated with employment growth in Poland and the Slovak Republic.
Third, peripheral agricultural regions have gone through difficult times during transition. In part this
can be explained by falling agricultural income in the candidate countries, which was caused by
adjustment to world market prices of both inputs and outputs leading to higher input and lower
output prices. The European Commission (2001) finds that poverty rates are particularly high in
rural areas of the candidate countries. The problems of rural areas, however, have also been
magnified by past experience. Rural areas in transition economies in particular were generally
characterised by high specialisation with few alternative sources of income and had an
underdeveloped infrastructure at the outset of transition (see European Commission, 2002).
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Integration in the European economy has undoubtedly been an important driving force not only of
macro-economic but also of regional development in candidate countries. While early studies
argued that regions bordering the European Union in general have profited from their vicinity to￿5 3￿
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EU countries, more recent studies ￿ influenced by the predictions of geography and trade models ￿
have tended to shift the focus on market access rather than vicinity to EU countries as a major
determinant of success in regional development. For instance, Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran
(2002) develop a model which predicts that regions with market access (to western or eastern
economies) should exhibit larger growth. In accordance with their model they find a larger increase
in urbanisation rates in Romania in regions which have better access to western markets. Similarly,
Bosco and Resimini (2002), in focusing on border regions, develop three types (those bordering on
EU countries, those bordering on other candidate countries and those bordering on other
countries), and find that borders to EU countries were less decisive in shaping regional growth
patterns than proximity to core EU countries. Finally, Spirindonova (2002) finds that, in Bulgaria,
regions located along international transport corridors and cities along the sea coast have been
more privileged, while western regions have not developed so well. In general this thus suggests
that integration of the candidate countries has had a markedly regional effect. In particular border
regions have profited from purchasing power inflows, foreign direct investments and higher trade
exposure, while capitals cities have often attracted FDI as well as profited from increased tourist
inflows.

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Since transition policies such as stabilisation, trade liberalisation and banking reform were
implemented at a national level, little research has focused on their regional impacts. The only
policy where substantial regional disparities can be found is in the rate of privatisation (see
Scarpetta and Huber, 1995). Recent research has focused on different aspects of privatisation
policy (FDI, new enterprise formations and actual privatisation). Such studies have found foreign
direct investment (Dostal, 1999, for the Czech Republic) and entrepreneurial spirit (Fazekas, 2000)
to be significant influences on development. The labour market consequences of faster or slower
paces of privatisations are, however, more complicated. In particular it seems that regions where
privatisation has been more rapid, job destruction processes in old formerly state-owned
enterprises have been faster (see Faggio and Konings, 2000; and Duffy and Walsh, 2002), as was
job creation in new enterprises. The aggregate effect of more rapid privatisation on unemployment
rates has thus remained ambiguous. Scarpetta (1995) for instance finds ambiguous results
concerning the impact of the private sector share on unemployment levels, while Fazekas (1996)
finds that entrepreneurial capacity in a region reduces unemployment.
14 The more rapid
restructuring in regions with faster privatisation, however, seems to have come at the price of
14 It must be stressed that interpreting the correlations between labour market developments and FDI, privatisation, etc.
as causal is burdened with methodological problems. Causality may run in both ways: Either one could argue that faster
privatisation and more FDI causes lower / higher unemployment or one could hold that regions with better development
prospects (which can be measured i.a. by unemployment) attract more FDI and privatisation.￿5 4￿
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higher income disparities. Sibley and Walsh (2002) find that in Poland regions deemed to be
further advanced in transition are also regions with higher internal regional disparities.
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Aside from divergence and polarisation tendencies, candidate countries have experienced
substantial structural change in the sectoral composition of employment in the last decade. Boeri
and Terrel (2002) for instance report that the private sector employment share in Central and
Eastern European candidate countries increased to 67.7% from virtually zero and that the share of
employment in small-scale firms with fewer than 100 employees was 41.7%, while the share of
services in total employment increased by 10.1 percentage points from 1989 to 1998. In
particular this last figure is interesting because theoretical research on structural change in
transition economies has shown little interest in the topic of structural change at the sectoral level
and even less so in the regional differentiation of this structural change although existing theory
and empirical evidence from the experience of the North American Free Trade Area and European
Union suggest that economic integration results in relocation of industrial activity as well as
potentially increasing regional specialisation and concentration of manufacturing activities.
These stylised facts are of particular interest in the context of transition because during the last two
decades there has been a growing academic and policy interest in the spatial impact of economic
integration, related to a general concern that structural change accompanying economic
integration is likely to result in increasing regional specialisation and concentration of industrial
activity, which in turn may make regions vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. In such a case, industry-
wide demand shocks may become region-specific shocks and the short-term adjustment costs may
be high if a firm is relocated. On the other hand, the long-run industrial relocation allows
exploiting gains from comparative advantages, and clustering of industrial activities is expected to
bring productivity growth. Central and Eastern European economies have experienced dramatic
changes in their trade structure as well as foreign direct investment. This rapidly increasing
integration with the European Union via trade and foreign direct investment in the last decade thus
provides a test ground for empirical analysis of the causes of structural change at the regional
level.
Sectoral structural change at the national level from 1989 to 1998 is analysed by Mickiewicz
(2001). He finds that the employment share of services has increased in the candidate countries.
Furthermore, the speed of change of industrial structures in these countries is faster than in
Portugal or Greece. Despite this tertiarisation, the share of industry in overall employment was still
above that of current EU members in 1998 (see Mickiewicz 1999). Mickiewicz and Zalewska
(2001 and 2002) as well as Mickiewicz (2001) find that there have been two distinct forms of
sectoral restructuring, which Mickiewicz (2001) terms the vertical path, where de-industrialisation
has led to increasing shares for the agricultural sector, and the horizontal path, where service
sector activity has replaced industrial activity. The vertical path has been followed by countries such￿5 5￿
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as Romania, Russia and Ukraine, while the horizontal path characterises many of the more
advanced transition economies such as those of the Vysegrad-4 as well as Estonia and Croatia.
Mickiewicz and Zalewska (2001 and 2002) also find that the determination with which of these
paths are followed seems to have been strongly determined by the institutional reform path taken
by the respective region. Econometric evidence suggests that indicators developed by the EBRD
concerning the extent of structural reforms are important in predicting structural change in the
candidate countries. In particular, successful restructuring at micro level (resulting from ownership
changes and implementation of efficient corporate governance systems) seems to covariate
strongly with the ￿efficient￿ sectoral restructuring at macro level.
Huber and Palme (2000) focus on structural change at the regional level by analysing the
developments of concentration and specialisation in the of the primary secondary and tertiary
sector. They find much the same results as Mickiewicz (2001). In particular:
• Since 1992, structural change has been significantly higher in the regions of Hungary,
Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic than in Spain, Italy or the Netherlands.
• Structural change has been carried by increasing shares of the tertiary sector and a reduced
share of the secondary as well as primary sector.
• Despite this change, the regions in the candidate countries still differ markedly in their
employment structure from current EU member states such as Italy and Spain. In general the
share of industry is higher than in the EU member states, and in some countries (Slovakia,
Poland) the primary sector plays a much more prominent role.
• In the secondary sector, economic activity has deconcentrated since 1992, but in the tertiary
sector it has concentrated in particular on capital cities in all countries except Slovakia where
exactly the opposite trends were registered.
• The specialisation of regions has increased rather than decreased in all countries considered
(Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary).
Traistaru, Nijkamp and Longhi (2002) investigate patterns of regional specialisation and
geographic concentration of manufacturing and their determinants in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary,
Romania and Slovenia using regional manufacturing employment data for the period 1990-1999.
The main findings of this study suggest that average regional specialisation has increased in
Bulgaria and Romania, decreased in Estonia and has not significantly changed in Hungary and
Slovenia. Regions bordering the EU are found to be less specialised than the national average
regional specialisation in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia while they are more specialised in
Bulgaria. Regions bordering other accession countries are found more specialised compared to the
national averages in Estonia and Hungary while in Bulgaria and Romania this type of regions are
less specialised. Regions bordering other countries (non EU, non accession countries) have
become more specialised with the exception of Romania. Non border regions are less specialised￿5 6￿
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in Bulgaria and Hungary and more specialised in Romania and Slovenia. High regional
specialisation is associated with bad economic performance while diversified regions perform
better. Regions bordering the EU are found to perform better than the other regions in Bulgaria,
Estonia and Hungary. Industries with high economies of scale, high technology and high wages are
concentrated while industries with low technology and low wages are dispersed. Geographic
concentration of manufacturing has increased significantly in Bulgaria but has not changed
significantly in the remaining four countries. The results of the econometric estimation of
determinants of manufacturing location suggest that both factor endowments and geographical
proximity to industrial centres explain the economic geography of manufacturing in accession
countries. Labour intensive industries tend to locate in regions with labour abundance while
regions endowed with researchers attract research intensive industries .. Industries with large
economies of scale tend to locate in regions close to industrial centres (the capital cities in
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary; European markets in the cases of Estonia, Hungary and
Romania).
 the case of Bulgaria, Spiridonova (2002) finds that in the period 1990-1999, absolute and
relative specialisation have increased in 21 regions out of 28. Most manufacturing industries
have become more concentrated. The most concentrated industry is Fuels and the least
concentrated is Food, Beverages, Tobacco. There has been a relative decrease in industrial
employment in the big cities (Sofia, Varna, Plovdiv, Gabrovo, Stara Zagora) and traditional
industrial centres (South - West, South - Central and North - Central). GDP per capita is
significantly and negatively associated with the regional unemployment rate suggesting that
poor regions are more likely to suffer high unemployment.
 In the case of Estonia, Fainshtein and Lubenets (2002) find that in the period 1990-1999,
absolute and relative specialisation have decreased in 4 out of 5 regions. Absolute
concentration increased in 4 out of 13 manufacturing branches while relative concentration
has increased in 6 manufacturing branches. The most concentrated industry is Motor Vehicles
and Transport Equipment and the least concentrated Food, Beverages and Tobacco.
Diversified regions have a higher GDP while specialised regions with a small number of
manufacturing industries have the lowest GDP per capita. In the analysed period, relocation of
manufacturing activity has taken place from the industrially developed regions to the periphery.
A negative relationship has been found between regional GDP and unemployment.
 In the case of Hungary, Redei (2002) finds that in the period 1992-1998, 12 out of 20 regions
have experienced an increasing specialisation in absolute terms but relative specialisation has
increased only in 8 regions. Western regions are more specialised compared with the rest of
the country. Geographic concentration has increased in 4 out of 10 industries. The most
concentrated industry is Chemicals and the least concentrated Machinery and Equipment.
Western and Central regions are more dynamic and are catching up with the European
averages while increasing polarisation seems to be the trend in Eastern and Southern regions.￿5 7￿
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 In the case of Romania, Traistaru and Pauna (2002) finds that in the period 1991-1999,
absolute specialisation has increased in 25 regions out of 41 while relative specialisation has
increased in 29 regions. The highest regional specialisation is found for Bucharest, North-East,
South - West and South and the lowest in the Centre, West and North - West. Most
manufacturing industries (10 out of 13) have become more concentrated. The most
concentrated industry is Electrical Machinery and the least concentrated Food, Beverages and
Tobacco. The evidence indicates a decreasing share of manufacturing employment in the
capital city and an increasing share of manufacturing employment in the Centre region.
Regional GDP has a greater concentration compared to GDP per capita. However, while the
degree of concentration of GDP has remained almost the same in the period 1993-1998, the
concentration of the GDP per capita has increased indicating a tendency towards income
polarisation. Regional specialisation is found to be negatively related to regional GDP and
unemployment rates.
 In the case of Slovenia, Damijan and Kostevc (2002b) find that in the period 1994-1998,
absolute and relative specialisation have increased in 7 out of 12 regions. The lowest regional
specialisation is observed in the largest regions (Osrednjeslovenska and Podravska) while
specialisation is the highest in the smallest regions (Spodnjeposavska and Zasavska) and in
Pomurska region. There is evidence of relocation of manufacturing activity between regions.
Regions with initial big shares of manufacturing employment have benefited more from the
economic integration with the EU while regions with low shares of manufacturing employment
have not gained from the relocation process. Econometric tests suggest that lower growth of
GDP per capita is associated with higher unemployment rates.
Resmini (2002) analyses determinants of location and growth of manufacturing activities in border
regions in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia and suggests that regions bordering
the European Union have been taking advantage of their location since the beginning of the
transition process. Thus, high wages, skilled labour force and a well developed service sector have
contributed to increasing employment in manufacturing activities relative to national averages.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is found to have a negative impact on relative employment,
probably due to severe restructuring processes adopted by foreign firms to make competitive the
former state-owned enterprises. The location of manufacturing activities in other border regions
has been positively affected not only by FDI, but also by region accessibility ￿ measured in terms of
road density ￿ skilled labour force and the service sector, while distance from the capital city, the
core of economic activity in several candidate countries, exerts a negative effect on relative
employment. Regional differences seem to be less marked when one considers relative
employment growth, which seems to have followed a pattern of convergence within regions and
have been led mainly by FDI. Region specific effects are only weakly supported by data. Growth
prospects seem to confirm the better position of border regions relative to internal ones. The
former are, on average, expected to grow, while the latter show stagnation or a small decline,￿5 8￿
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other things being equal. Among border regions, regions bordering the European Union and
external countries (non European Union, non accession countries) show the highest predicted
growth rates. It is, however, worth noticing that prospects for growth are country-specific.
Traistaru and Wolf (2002) investigate and explain regional differentials in employment changes in
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Using a shift-share method this paper finds that the variance of
regional employment change is driven almost entirely by region-specific factors while regional
specialisation and regional competitiveness play only a minor role in explaining regional
employment change differentials. Employment change differentials are uniform across sectors and
vary across regions. This implies that the nature of shocks seem to be region-wide rather than
industry-specific. Over the period 1990-1999 the share of the variance due to region-specific
factors has decreased however in Bulgaria and Hungary while in Romania has increased.
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Aside from long-term developments of regional convergence and specialisation, regional labour
market research in advanced market economies has in recent years been particularly interested in
the short-term labour market adjustments of regions. In particular Blanchard and Katz (1992), in a
seminal paper, estimate structural vector autocorrelations (SVARs) including participation rates,
employment growth and labour force growth to identify the effect of regional labour demand
shocks in US states. They find that in a typical American state, shocks to labour demand feed into a
permanent reduction in employment, while due to high interregional migration, participation rate
and unemployment rate reactions are short-lived only. In contrast to this, Decressin and Fatas
(1995) and Fatas (2000) find that in European countries the reaction of participation rates is more
long-lived than in the US, due to lacking interregional migration. Furthermore, similar results for
individual countries were derived for Spain (Bentolila and Jimeno, 1995; and Mauro and
Spilimbergo, 1999) and to a lesser degree for Belgium and Sweden (Delaigle and Lohest, 1999;
Fredrikson, 1995).
In the context of candidate countries, little research has been devoted to applying this
methodology. W￿rg￿tter and Huber (1999) and Huber (2002) applied some of the methods used
in this literature with regional labour data for candidate countries. In Huber and W￿rg￿tter (1999),
we estimate a bivariate structural vector auto-regression on monthly regional unemployment rates
to identify the asymmetry and persistence of region-specific shocks in Poland, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia. We find that region-specific shocks account for around 60% of the total variance of
regional unemployment rates in these countries. Also we find that region-specific shocks were
highly persistent during the period from 1991 to 1996.
In Huber (2002), we use annual data from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Slovenia to analyse the univariate properties of regional labour market indicators and compare
results to a set of European Union member states. We find that, in general, unemployment rates￿5 9￿
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tend to be more persistent and participation rates less persistent than in member states and that
intra-national migration is low and declining in the candidate countries. We, however, also find
substantial heterogeneity among both candidate as well as member states which leads us to
conclude that national differences in labour market adjustment within the two regions considered
may be more important than differences between regions.
! "
Given the lines along which regional disparities currently develop in the candidate countries, there
is some potential for accession to accelerate regional divergence. In particular the major changes
induced by accession hold a potential to encourage growth primarily in already privileged regions:
1. Given the distance dependence of FDI, the fact that foreign direct investment occurs mainly in
regions which already have better regional prospects and that headquarters primarily locate in
large (capital) cities, increased FDI could encourage regional growth in regions which are
already prospering, while less prosperous regions may fall behind.
2. Given the substantial liberalisation of trade with agricultural products and the lower
productivity in agriculture in the candidate countries, it can be assumed that rural regions ￿
already lagging in regional development ￿ will require substantially more restructuring
compared to urban regions.
3. Given that all regions of the candidate countries (with the exception of perhaps some capital
cities) will become objective 1 regions, and that national funds devoted to regional
development are limited, the likelihood that regional policy will contribute to equalising
intranational regional disparities in candidate countries seems limited.
Evidence of a potential of regional specialisation causing increased business cycle asymmetries
within countries, by contrast, seems to be much less clear cut. Experience in the last decade
suggests that much of the developments of concentration and specialisation are country- and/or
industry-specific and to a large degree shaped by the inherited economic geography of the
socialist regimes.￿6 0￿
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While the analysis of internal adjustment mechanisms in the candidate countries gives an
indication of the status quo, the multidimensionality of the European integration process introduces
an element of endogeneity of the institutional framework to the integration process, which cannot
easily be dealt with by analysing these countries on their own. As candidate countries become
integrated in the European Union, their policy makers￿ incentives will change, they will have some
decision power concerning policy making at the European level and they will develop own interests
concerning the future process of European integration.
This ￿political integration￿ will also have implications on the labour market performance of
candidate countries. At least three reasons for such endogeneity have been given in the literature:
• First, as recently argued by Burda (1998), accession to the European Union could impede the
capability of candidate countries to cope with asymmetric shocks on the labour market if the
adoption of the social a ac cquis quis of the Union leads to reduced labour market flexibility.
• Second, as pointed out by Clamours (2001) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001), membership in
the EMU may itself reduce incentives for labour market reforms since national wage bargainers
may fail to internalise the external effect of their labour market reforms on the other member
states. Indeed empirical evidence presented by Van Poeck and Borhijs (2001) suggests that
prospective EMU members reformed labour markets institutions less than non-EMU members in
the last decade, even when they were characterised by high equilibrium unemployment rates.
• Third, access to substantial regional transfers within the framework of the cohesion funds, if
used mainly to finance transfers rather than investment in low income regions, could in effect
distort incentives to migrate and lead to even lower migration levels than already observed
today. Indeed such arrangements are more likely when regional funds are distributed by a
central state (see Perotti, 2001).
One way to learn about the relevance of such potential endogeneity is to study previous integration
experiences of other countries. One case of such integration that has received substantial attention
in recent research was North American (NAFTA) integration. In this case the effects of integration
on the overall economy and in particular on border regions has been widely researched. Isolating
the integration effects, however, has proven far from easy. This is due on the one hand to a
shortage of data and on the other hand to the financial crisis in Mexico and the subsequent steep
decline of GDP in 1995 (see European Integration Consortium, 2001).
A series of papers summarised by Hanson (1998) researches the impact of integration on both the
border regions in the US and in Mexico. Following the prediction of economic theory (in particular
by models of new economic geography) which holds that when trade liberalisation occurs￿6 1￿
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economic activity should move closer to the foreign market (provided this foreign market is large
enough relative to the home economy), Hanson correlates regional employment and wage growth
on measures of centrality of a region vis-￿-vis the home economy and the foreign economy (the US
for Mexico and Mexico for the US). He finds that before trade liberalisation with the US,
accessibility to US markets played a less important role and distance to Mexico City a more
important role in explaining regional wage and employment growth. By contrast, no such changes
can be found for the US. This implies that trade liberalisation with Mexico was just ￿too small to
matter￿ from the point of view of the American economy.
North American integration is, however, a rather inappropriate benchmark for European
integration, although differences in GDP per capita between the US and Mexico are comparable to
differences between the EU and candidate countries. NAFTA is primarily concerned with trade
liberalisation rather than full integration into an economic and monetary union as is the case for
the European Union (see European Integration Consortium, 2001). In this chapter we thus focus
on the literature on two European integration episodes: first, integration of the southern European
member states and, second, German unification. Each of these integration cases has its own
strengths and weaknesses as an analogy to integration by the candidate countries.
German unification is to date the only example of integration of a formerly planned economy into
a Western European state. At the same time it represents the most radical integration experiment
on the European continent in post-war history. As such it included a number of features which are
not under discussion in the case of accession of candidate countries, such as the immediate
integration into both a monetary as well as a social union, which brought about a 370% increase
in labour costs in East Germany, as well as implementing the West German system of wage
bargaining, which tended to reduce wage pressure (see Heitger, 2001). Furthermore, German
unification included regional transfers to East Germany which far exceeded the West German
levels and was associated with a radical privatisation and reform programme in East Germany.
Finally, this economy obtained the institutional system of one of the most developed market
economies in Europe overnight. Accession of the ￿southern EU members￿ of Spain, Portugal and
Greece by contrast is arguably more similar to what can be expected from the CEEC￿s accession to
the European Union in terms of institutional changes. However, it occurred at a time when
fundamental aspects of the acquis communautaire were not developed to the same degree as is
the case in Europe today.
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German unification is thus a somewhat special case of European integration. While at the outset
political observers in particular were optimistic that existing income disparities would rapidly
diminish, on condition that substantial financial aid is given and considering the relatively good
starting position of East Germany, recent literature takes a more sober look at the achievements of
unification. Specifically, it has been shown that the process of convergence in terms of productivity￿6 2￿
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which characterised the early phases of transition came to a halt after 1999 (see Sinn and
Westermann, 2000), that investment in the East German economy ￿ after a surge in housing
investments supported by generous tax benefits ￿ declined relative to that in West Germany, and
that wage convergence between East and West Germany is also proceeding more slowly than
originally expected. This has led more recent inquiries in the speed of convergence of the East
German economy to assume that it may take up to 20 years for East Germany GDP to reach a
level of 80% of West Germany.
The failure to converge and the high regional transfers granted to East Germany have led Sinn and
Westermann (2000) to liken East Germany to the Mezziogiorno (see also Boltho, 1997). According
to them, high subsidies causing a negative value of capital, welfare payments, extreme wage
demands by German unions are to blame for the long-term failure of the East German economy to
converge to Western European levels. In a similar vein, Canova (2000) shows that in a two-region
model of German integration redistributive measures of the welfare state may contribute to turning
the original ￿win-win situation￿ of German unification into a situation associated with welfare
losses. In this interpretation of events, the primary lessons from German unification for Eastern
Europe are that high transfers paired with inflexible labour market regulations as well as excessive
wages are the primary reasons for the failure of Eastern Germany to converge to Western
European welfare levels.
This view has, however, not gone unchallenged. For instance, Bonin and Zimmermann (2000)
argue that focusing on negotiated wages may distort the picture since wage drift (i.e. paying wages
in excess of bargained minimum wages) is common in West Germany but rare in East Germany.
Furthermore, a substantial part of East German firms are not covered by union wage agreements
and pay substantially lower wages than their counterparts in West Germany, and, finally, a number
of extra payments such as a holiday or Christmas bonus are not as common in East Germany as
they are in West Germany. In their view, high unemployment rates in Eastern Germany can be
attributed to a combination of high labour supply and the lack of modernisation, especially in the
public sector. Reading empirical evidence this way suggests that German integration has also put
West German unions under considerable pressure and actually undermined trade union power in
Germany (see European Integration Consortium, 2001).
Yet another interpretation of the events is given by Brakman et al. (1999). They argue that what
was originally assumed to be good starting conditions in the framework of a neo-classical model,
may be interpreted less favourably when viewed in the eyes of more modern theories of regional
development. In particular they argue that transport costs were dramatically reduced between East
an West Germany by unification, which in increasing returns to scales economies will favour the
development of the larger region rather than the smaller region, leading to an emigration of both
labour and capital. They also find that the stylised facts of sectoral development in East Germany
tend to support such explanations. Again this interpretation may hold some important implications
for regional development strategies in the candidate countries. In particular it suggests that starting￿6 3￿
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conditions in the candidate countries must be compatible to their accession to the European
Union.
Aside from examining the reasons for the failure to converge in terms of productivity, inter-German
integration has been used to analyse wage convergence and migration processes between the two
countries. As to wage convergence, an early study by Kruger and Pischke (1992) finds that East
German wage structures were relatively quick to adjust to West German levels. In particular they
find that returns to education increased dramatically and approached West German levels, as did
wage inequality. Kruger and Pischke (1992) show that the East German wage structure still differed
substantially from West Germany and that age-experience profiles in particular were much flatter in
East Germany. This was interpreted to be a sign of convergence of wage structures.
More recent evidence presented by Steiner and Wagner (1997) and Burda and Schmidt (1997),
however, suggests that much of this convergence has come to a halt. Steiner and Wager (1997)
for instance find that the differences in wages between East and West Germans can be explained
to a very small degree only by differences in observables such as educational attainment, etc. Most
of the differences appear to be due to differences in returns to age, experience and education.
Similarly, Burda and Schmidt (1997) show that differences in returns to age and experience seem
to be very important in explaining East-West wage differentials, since the wage disadvantage of
East Germans is increasing with age at unification, and relative wage growth for East Germans is
increasing with time remaining in the labour force.
There are also a number of empirical papers which analyse the determinants of East-West
migration in Germany after unification on the basis of micro (i.e. individual) and macro data sets.
The most comprehensive is Hunt (2000), other important contributions are Burda (1993), Burda et
al. (1998), Schwarze (1996) and Pischke et al. (1994).
The paper by Hunt is based on the GSOEP household panel (1990￿1997) and on regional data
at the state (Land) level (1991￿1996). The regressions based on individual data explain migration
and commuting probabilities by a set of individual variables (age, education, gender, family status)
as well as distance and time dummies. Some regressions include wages and employment status.
The results confirm the ￿brain drain￿ hypothesis, i.e. education and migration/commuting are
indeed positively correlated. Moreover, individual unemployment has a strong impact. The
evidence for wage levels is weak. However, the regressions based on state data provide strong
evidence for the hypothesis that migration is motivated by wage and employment differences
between the receiving and sending locations. Hunt provides valuable insights into the determinants
of East-West migration.
The papers by Burda (1993) and Burda et al. (1998) similarly rest on the GSOEP data. They
explain migration intentions as revealed in the GSOEP rather than actual migration basically by
income variables and a set of individual characteristics. The key variable, however, is the wage
differential. The main finding of the papers is that there is a non-linear relationship between wage￿6 4￿
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differences and migration propensities, which is interpreted as evidence for the option value theory
of migration under uncertainty (see Burda, 1995). This non-linearity in the relationship between
migration and wage levels is also confirmed by an analysis of regional data by Van Leuvensteijn
and Parikh (2000).
Schwarze (1996) combines information on intended and actual migration. He finds a negative
impact of wage levels and, surprisingly, a positive impact of wage growth in East Germany with
regard to actual migration, results which run counter to intuitive expectations. He stresses the
importance of expected wages which may significantly differ from observed individual wages. Using
individual responses considering the probability of job losses, Schwarze constructs subjectively
expected wages for each individual. After rerunning the model with expected wages, the
coefficients are in general more plausible. Wages still have a negative effect on actual migration
and the coefficient of wage growth is also negative although not significant.
The paper of Pischke et al. (1994) is based on the Arbeitsmarktmonitor on east-west commuting
from November 1990 to November 1991. They find, inter alia, a positive correlation between
commuting and education levels. Another analysis of place-to-place commuting between East and
West Germany at Kreis level in 1997 is presented by Alecke and Untied (2000). They find that both
wage and unemployment rate differentials between sending and receiving regions exert a
significant influence on commuting, but distance seems to have a stronger influence. An increase
in the unemployment differential by 1% between the sending and the receiving region increases
commuting by around 0.4%, and decreasing the wage differential between receiving and sending
regions by 1% reduces migration by 0.4%. The elasticity of commuting with respect to distance is
around 1.3 by contrast.
Altogether, the empirical literature on east-west migration and commuting supports the ￿brain
drain￿ hypothesis, i.e. higher qualified East Germans tend to migrate more than those less
qualified. Moreover, a negative correlation between age and migration confirms a standard
hypothesis of the human capital theories of migration, added to which other migration factors, i.e.
distance, family and other social ties, affect migration and commuting decisions. It is important to
note that the theoretical foundation of most empirical models is either missing or shaky. More
specifically, there are three areas where additional work can provide significant contributions:
• The relationship between migration flows (or stocks) on the one hand, and wages and other
income variables on the other is not derived from a coherent theoretical framework. Empirical
models derived from economic theory may well result in other specifications and help to
understand intriguing results such as the non-linear relationship between wage and income
variables which have been found inter alia by Burda et al. (1998).
• The relationship between the human capital characteristics of migrants and relative wage
differences (or income distribution) between regions is not explored. This is of particular interest
for our question. Including either variables on the income distribution in macro- or wage￿6 5￿
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differences for specific skills in micro models may provide additional insights into the economic
determinants of the human capital composition of migrants.
As practiced by the whole literature, wage and employment variables are treated as being
exogenous. However, we are also interested in the wage and employment impact of emigration.
We should at least consider the possibility of endogeneity of the wage and employment variables
with regard to migration.
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While German unification is a rather extreme case of integration both in terms of scope and speed,
southern enlargement may be looked upon as slightly more representative of the accession of
current candidate countries to the EU. There are, however, some caveats to be entered against this
comparison. Since the southern EU member states joined the Union, the acquis has developed
substantially. Thus the Union today is different from the Union joined by Spain, Portugal and
Greece. Furthermore, income differentials between joining members and bordering incumbents
were smaller than can be expected from eastward enlargement (see European Integration
Consortium, 2001).
Given the substantial experience of Europe with much more far-reaching integration than the case
of NAFTA, only very little systematic research has come forth on the link between integration and
regional as well as national development. Recently, the European Integration Consortium (2001)
conducted a major study which documents the substantial heterogeneity of national developments
after southern enlargement (Spain, Portugal and Greece). The major conclusions of this study and
related research can be summarised by five points:
1. There is some evidence that integration has increased industrial restructuring as measured by
job creation and job destruction rates, as well as sectoral shifts which grew in each of the three
countries. This was, however, also the case in other EU countries. Similarly, the degree of
openness increased and the direction of trade of the countries changed. This seems to have
been a long-term trend since the 1960s which cannot be directly linked to the accession. There
is, however, some evidence that foreign intermediary inputs were substituted for native ones as
a consequence of accession (see de Broer and Martinez, 1999; and De Broer, Martinez and
Harkema, 2000).
2. Inward FDI flows increased substantially after accession in both Spain and Portugal but not in
Greece, which may be attributed to the political instability and poor macroeconomic
performance in this country. This can be taken as weak evidence of an increase in FDI.
3. Migration from the member states after the expiry of derogation periods for the joining
countries seems to have followed highly country-specific patterns. While emigration of￿6 6￿
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Portuguese to France increased, no such effect can be found for the flow of Portuguese to
Germany or the Spanish to either Germany or France (see Alecke et al., 2001).
4. The most important momentum for development has come from structural funds. These have
increased public investment in the countries considered. According to estimates by Bosca et al.
(1998), the stock of public capital would have been 10% lower in these countries without
structural funds, while De la Fuente and Vives (1995) suggest that regional funds added 2
percentage points to average productivity growth.
5. The evidence suggests that labour market development depended strongly on the flexibility of
national labour markets. The favourable development in Portugal can be attributed to a
generally more flexible labour market while the less favourable development in Spain may be
attributed (aside from statistical differences) to differences in the institutional preconditions for
labour market flexibility.
All in all, this does not provide a clear cut picture concerning the effects of past integration on the
labour market and regional development. More evidence with regard to labour market
developments is given in Burda (1998). He argues that, while labour market developments after
accession remain inconclusive, a clear tendency can be found for unemployment rates to increase
shortly before accession. This suggests that a substantial part of restructuring and institutional
changes is accomplished before accession.
Similarly, evidence on the effects of integration on regional development is scant. De la Fuente
(2002) analyses the impact of integration on convergence in Spain. He concludes that much
depends on the concrete policy options taken by the government and the adequate use of
structural funds. His results also clearly suggest that equalisation of schooling levels across regions
and redistributive public investment have contributed to convergence, while falling migration rates
and increased structural change have contributed to reducing convergence rates in Spain since
accession. In Huber and Palme (2001), we perform difference-in-difference tests of GDP growth
performance of border and non-border regions before and after accession. We find no statistically
significant changes in growth rate differences between border and non-border regions in Spain
and France. This leads us to conclude that previous integration experiences have not affected
border regions in an unambiguous way. A slightly more encompassing view of convergence is
taken by Delhey (2001). He argues that, aside from economic indicators, other indicators such as
life satisfaction should be included when looking at social and economic catch-up processes due
to integration. He similarly concludes that ￿EU integration obviously facilitates processes of catch-
up but does not guarantee them.￿
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In general, an analysis of previous enlargements does not give any clear guidance on the concrete
effects of EU integration ￿ neither the development of internal cohesion nor the development of￿6 7￿
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catch-up processes in the acceding countries. Positive examples such as that of Spain are
accompanied by less favourable experiences such as that of East Germany. This suggests that it
may be premature at this stage of the discussion to jump to conclusions concerning the overall
impact of EU enlargement on the candidate countries. The literature does, however, suggest that
the speed of structural change and industrial restructuring is increased during the period of
accession, which may stretch back some time before the actual accession date.
Furthermore, experience does not suggest that the labour markets of the new entrants may expect
immediate and unconditional reductions in unemployment rates. Most analysis points to a slight
increase in unemployment at least at the outset, due to greater structural change, which may feed
into long-term increases if institutions and policy do not react appropriately.
The evidence collected in this chapter also suggests that a decisive role is played by policy in
determining the success of integration. If labour market institutions in countries do not provide
sufficient flexibility to adapt to the original structural shock of accession and if wage policy fails to
take into account the particular challenges faced by accession, this may contribute to long-term
labour market problems. This underlines the necessity of measures to enable workers to satisfy the
demand for mobility, but also the importance of income policy to take a realistic approach to the
speed of convergence after accession. Furthermore, if regional funds are not used to enhance the
endogenous growth potential of the respective countries, this may lead to a long-term failure to
converge.￿6 8￿
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The central focus of this literature summary was to describe labour markets and regional
development in transition countries, identify the sources of changes in the candidate countries
triggered by accession to the European Union and discuss some of the results regarding the likely
impact of the changes on labour markets in the candidate countries. We find that there has been
substantial convergence of candidate countries to Western European institutions and labour market
outcomes. Furthermore, there has been substantial heterogeneity among countries. Despite this,
the labour markets in the candidate countries have their individual features, most important among
them:
• Long and persistent reductions in employment rates to levels which are in general lower than in
the more successful member states as well as a higher incidence of long-term unemployment,
which ranges in the upper half of the EU member states for all candidate countries.
• More severe mass redundancy regulations and weaker trade unions and social partnership
organisations.
• Low turnover in and out of unemployment despite substantial structural change. In particular
flows out of unemployment have remained small and most of the change in the sector
composition of the work force seems to have been accomplished by job-to-job mobility paired
with early retirements and new workers.
• Declining internal migration rates despite rising regional disparities.
Given these ￿stylised facts￿, only few of the studies have been concerned with the issues of labour
market dynamics and adjustments in candidate countries. Preliminary evidence suggests that wages
may react somewhat more strongly to changes in regional unemployment rates, but the evidence is
far from conclusive. Furthermore, little is known on how, e.g., labour supply, migration and wages
react to aggregate changes in labour demand.
We also identified three sources through which EU candidate countries may experience changes in
their institutions. These are: first, institutional changes triggered by adopting the social acquis,
environmental and competition policy as well as ￿ probably at a later stage ￿ accession to EMU,
second, the impact of the EU￿s structural policy on the candidate countries, and third, changes in
trade, foreign direct investment and migration. We find that in assessing the consequences of most
of these changes the literature is far from unanimous. It is thus probably still too early to assess the
potential effects of these changes from the literature. Nonetheless a number of important
hypotheses can be developed from the literature surveyed:
1. Substantial evidence suggests that integration has important structural and distributional effects
as well as positive aggregate effects. In particular, both for theoretical reasons as well as from￿6 9￿
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empirical evidence it can be held that some sectors will be affected positively and others more
negatively. This may result in differentiated regional outcomes, to the degree that regions are
specialised in certain sectors.
2. Given the effect of integration on structural change, this suggests that the capability of labour
markets in candidate countries to adjust to structural shocks will to a large degree determine
the labour market effects of integration.
3. There is substantial theoretical evidence, however, which suggests that extrapolating purely
from the current labour market dynamics to a time after enlargement may lead to
misinterpretations, since the ￿adjustment mechanism￿ may be endogenous to integration.
4. Empirical work on previous enlargements and integration cases suggests that national policy
decisions and use of structural funds are a key element in triggering regional development and
catching up.
This suggests that regional (and more generally distributional) issues should be given attention
when analysing integration effects. Experience from previous enlargements, although far from
conclusive, seems to suggest that accession to the European Union is associated with a series of
structural shocks and thus accelerates the speed of structural change and industrial restructuring.
This confirms the importance of flexibility for accession to be economically successful.
Furthermore, the scant scientific analysis of previous enlargements suggests that convergence of
GDP per capita levels is far from automatic after accession. Policy takes a more decisive role in
determining the experience of enlargement than is usually suggested by pure model-oriented
economic analysis. In this respect looking at previous research on regional development in
candidate countries points at some potential for further divergence of intranational disparities even
after accession if national policies are not formulated to counter these effects. The literature finds
evidence for divergence in regional development, low migration rates between regions, as well as
some evidence that the expected shocks of enlargements (FDI, trade and migration) may have
decisively regional implications which are likely to reinforce existing lines of differentiation. Much of
the developments of concentration and specialisation by contrast seem to be country- and or
industry-specific and to a large degree shaped by the inherited economic geography of the
socialist regimes. This suggests that in the accession countries regional policy may play a decisive
role in determining the speed of convergence at both national and regional level.
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While differences among the candidate countries seem to be larger than among current EU
member states, these facts point to a number of challenges that will be faced in regional labour
markets of most candidate countries. Given the importance that accession will succeed for￿7 0￿
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candidate countries as well as member states, answers to the following questions seem to be
particularly urgent:
• Why is the probability of escaping from unemployment so low in the candidate countries and
how can schooling, active labour market policy and wage policy help to increase flexibility in
the particular economic circumstances of candidate countries? What hinders firms to hire
unemployed? These issues may be particularly relevant from a policy perspective when
considering the importance of both labour market flexibility in the candidate countries and the
importance of human capital development in catch-up processes.
• Why are migration rates so low despite high regional disparities? Can inefficiency in housing
markets, spatial mismatching or liquidity constraints help to explain the lack of migration? How
is low migration reflected in other aspects of regional labour market adjustment (such as wage
flexibility, unemployment and participation decisions)? Answering these questions is important
for policy makers for two reasons: first, answers to these questions will make it possible to
formulate proper policies to enhance labour market adjustment; second, if analysed in
sufficient detail, an indication will be obtained of which social groups may be most strongly
affected by integration.
• What have been the reasons for regional divergence in most labour market indicators in the
candidate countries and how has this divergence impacted on more latent features of the
labour market such as labour supply decisions by individuals and recruiting decisions by firms?
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Given the issues raised in this literature survey, we will, in the future, focus in greater detail on
regional adjustment to shocks in candidate countries. We will estimate an economic model of
regional labour markets, using techniques of panel econometrics to identify shocks to labour
demand and labour supply in selected candidate countries. The effects of such shocks will be
simulated to assess their dynamic impact on regional labour markets. In a first step, we will present
overall results. In a second step, we will focus on different adjustment paths across different types
of regions and compare these to EU countries.
One of the major puzzles concerning labour market adjustments raised by this survey is the low
and declining mobility in most candidate countries. To find out the causes, we will focus on
determinants of migration and mobility in the candidate countries. We will model and analyse the
earnings and mobility outcomes for individuals in candidate countries, and compare them to the
patterns observed in Western Europe as well as measuring the flows across labour force states
(employment, unemployment and non-participation in the labour force) and analyse the
determinants of the labour supply decision. Finally, since, as the survey suggests, educational
attainment may be a key element in explaining low mobility, we will focus on training and
qualification issues by quantifying the allocation of the work force by skill category, across earnings￿7 1￿
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groups, industries and occupations at the start of the transition process. We will estimate the
relationship between human capital and measures of regional labour market outcomes, while
controlling for other relevant variables and the selection bias due to the endogeneity of individual
mobility decisions. Finally, will we study schooling choices by gender in the mid and late 1990s as
a function of the changes in relative earnings.
Firm level behaviour will also be analysed. In particular the influence of institutional settings of the
labour market, including employment protection, on the decisions of individual firms and their
effect on downsizing paths will be explored. In the light of the literature survey, hiring and firing
behaviour in enterprises, the internal composition of employment, a distinction between incumbent
workers and new hires seem to be of particular importance, as are the choices of wage or
employment cuts open to downsizing firms.
From this research we expect to be able to provide a set of ￿stylised facts￿ on how candidate
countries have adjusted to different labour demand and supply shocks in the past and which can
be compared to labour market dynamics in the EU member states. Furthermore, different
adjustment mechanisms (changes in participation rates, migration, wage and unemployment
changes) in the labour markets of selected transition countries will be analysed in detail, with
particular emphasis on the problems of different labour market groups.
As has been repeatedly stressed in this literature survey, adjustment mechanisms may be
endogenous to integration. For this reason we use two further experiences of integration to identify
such potential changes.
1. We will look at East German integration. Our main focus will be migration. We will focus on
the individual motives for east and west migration and commuting after German unification by
modelling migration and commuting as an investment in human capital. A probit regression
model derived from these theoretical considerations will be used. Furthermore, we will estimate
the economic consequences of migration and commuting on home labour markets in Eastern
Germany by deriving theoretical hypotheses for the empirical analysis from the ￿brain drain￿
literature and theories of regional agglomeration.
2. We will analyse regional development in border regions. Regional data will be used for an
assessment of the consequences of cancelling the border within Germany, opening the border
to candidate countries and previous enlargements. We focus on whether the regions on the
eastern side of the border experienced a labour cost advantage and whether this locational
advantage has been transformed into positive regional economic development. In the analysis,
the specific industrial compositions of the regions will be taken into account in order to identify
shocks from the transition process. This work will allow us to address the different impact of
local wage consequences on skilled and unskilled workers.￿7 2￿
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